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MAKING THE RIGHT GAMBLE: THE
ODDS ON PROBABLE CAUSE
Ronald J. Bacigal"
More so than any other provision of the Bill of Rights, the
Fourth Amendment has always been a deadly serious gamble.
How much of our collective security are we willing to risk in
order to promote individual freedom? 1
The framers of the amendment have given us one answer
to this question2-intrusions upon liberty and privacy may
take place when the government has probable cause that the
search will uncover the sought-after goods or that the seized
person committed a crime. Yet the Supreme Court has said
very little about computing the odds-the degree of
certainty-that determines when probable cause exists. The

• Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. Funding for this
work was underwritten by the National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law
at the University of Mississippi School of Law, which is supported by a grant
from the Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice
Assistance. I thank my friends and colleagues, John Douglass and Corinna Lain,
for their comments on an earlier draft, and for enduring my endless ruminations
on this topic.
1
In construing probable cause for seizure of a person, Gerstein u. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 112 (1975) stated that this standard "represents a necessary
accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to
control crime." See also JACOB w. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13 (The Johns
Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical and Political Sci., Series No. 84, 1966) (the
issues raised under the Fourth Amendment "bring into sharp focus the classic
dilemma of order versus liberty in the democratic state").
2
In addressing the conflict between enforcing the law in protection of the
community, and protecting the community from unreasonable interferences with
privacy, the Court has labeled probable cause as "the best compromise that has
been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more
would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave lawabiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
Probable cause, however, is but one form of justification for constitutional
searches. See infra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
recognition of various forms of justification involving balancing and special needs).
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case law on probable cause harbors a central ambiguity
because the Court has told us that probable cause lies
between bare suspicion and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 3
Within this sizable range, "[t]he emphasis is on calculating
likelihoods. Whether this excludes all other factors and
whether the likelihood must be 'more likely than not' are
questions arguably unsettled.'14
Just how unsettled these questions are can be
demonstrated by considering two hypotheticals: 5
1. A small commuter plane takes off with two pilots, a
flight attendant and ten passengers. When the attendant
slips into the bathroom, a would-be hijacker locks her in and
attempts to take over the plane. The attendant can discern
the voices of five hijackers as they coordinate their attack on
the cockpit. She then hears the voices of five passengers who
rally to thwart the attempted hijacking. The stalemate ends
when the pilot makes an emergency landing and the police
take control of the plane. Predictably, the passengers split
into two groups of five, each group claiming to be the heroic
passengers while identifying the other group as the terrorists.
The police thus face a situation where there is a 50/50 chance
that each passenger is a terrorist.

Do these facts constitute probable cause to detain, arrest or
search each passenger? Is there probable cause to search each
passenger's luggage, their autos parked at the airport and their
residences?
If the answers to the first hypothetical seem preordained

3
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175. "'The substance of all the definitions' of probable
cause 'is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.' And this 'means less than
evidence which would justify condemnation' or conviction . . . [but) more than
bare suspicion." Id. (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881); Locke
v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 (1813)) (citations and footnote omitted).
• Valente v. Wallace, 332 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
• These hypotheticals were inspired by Professor Nesson's famous "prisoner"
hypothetical where only one of twenty-five identically dressed prisoners refuses to
participate in the killing of a guard. Because Professor Nesson gives us no way to
distinguish among the prisoners, the odds as to any one prisoner are a 96%
likelihood of guilt, and a 4% likelihood of innocence. Charles R. Nesson,
Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV.

L. REV. 1187, 1192-93 (1979).
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in a post-September 11 world, are the answers altered in any
way when the facts of the hypothetical are modified as follows:
2. This time, when the attendant enters the bathroom, a
defective latch temporarily locks her in. A nicotine deprived
passenger seizes the opportunity to light a cigarette. The
attendant can hear the voices of four other passengers who
agree to share the cigarette. She also hears the protests of
five passengers who object to the second-hand smoke. When
the attendant frees herself and confronts the passengers, she
is faced with two five person groups, each group claiming to
be the non-smokers while identifying the others as the
smokers.

Again, is there probable cause to detain, arrest or search
each passenger? Is there probable cause to search each
passenger's luggage, their autos parked at the airport and their
residences?
This article seeks the answer to the hypotheticals in
sources ranging from the judiciary's own pronouncements on
probable cause to linguistics, history mathematics and
cognitive psychology.

A LINGUISTIC VIEW OF PROBABLE CAUSE
If we begin at the beginning, we must give some attention
to the common usage of the term "probable." "At first blush, the
phrase [probable cause] seems to connote a standard akin to
more than fifty percent,m; i.e., more likely than not that the
search will turn up sought-after items or that the seized person
is guilty of a crime. After all, if the weatherman says it's probably going to rain today, I assume he's talking about more than
a 50% chance. But that assumption may not be universally
shared. Webster's defines "probable" as meaning "supported by
evidence strong enough to establish presumption but not
proof."7 Putting a legal spin on the words "presumption" and
"proof," provides some support for the "more likely than not

6
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 784 (1994).
7

WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 916 ( 1973).
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standard." Juries in civil cases are instructed that the party
with the burden of proof must convince them by a preponderance of evidence, i.e., more likely than not. 8 Judges apply presumptions to establish a prima facia case, a degree of
likelihood sufficient to decide the issue until rebutted.
This slight linguistic support for equating "probable" with
"more likely" is undercut, however, by the very same
dictionary's alternative definition of "probable" as "likely to be
or become true or real."9 The word "likely" is not modified by
the term "more likely," or by mathematical likelihoods such as
50%, 30%, and so on. About the only thing clear is that "likely
to be or become true or real" sounds more certain than the
dictionary's characterization of "possible," as "something that
may or may not occur." 10 Like the Supreme Court, semantic
interpretation of the term "probable" seems comfortable only
with placing the term somewhere between the range of a 1% to
100% likelihood. The lower end of this range is identified as
"mere possibility" in the dictionary, and as "mere conjecture" in
the Court's lexicon. The upper end of the range is referred to in
the dictionaries as "presumption but not proof," while the Court
prefers the terminology of "less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt." In short, the Court has its own preferred language, but
has neither improved upon nor worsened the linguistic uncertainty surrounding the term probable.
Still lurking somewhere in that semantic tangle between
1% and 100% likelihood is the dividing line between probable
and improbable. When the Court speaks of "fair probability," 11
it implicitly recognizes that there must be a contrasting "unfair
probability," often labeled mere speculation or conjecture. Spec-

8
A typical jury instruction in a civil action is:
[I)t is proper to find that a party has succeeded in carrying the burden of
proof on an issue of fact if, after consideration of all the evidence in the
case, the jurors believe that what is sought to be proved on that issue is
more likely true than not true.
2 HON. EDWARD J. DEVITI & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 71.13 (3d ed. 1977).
• WEBSTER'S, supra note 7, at 917.
io Id.
11
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
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ifying a standard of certainty for probable cause necessarily entails drawing a dividing line on the spectrum of uncertainty. As
is so often the case in life and the law, we are faced with drawing a dividing line. To recognize this task is not to abandon
hope because Justice Holmes assured us that the question of
where to draw the line is "pretty much everything worth arguing in the law. "12
If linguists and Supreme Court Justices haven't pinned
down this elusive creature called probable cause, perhaps our
forefathers did the heavy lifting for us and settled upon a more
precise definition of the term. At this point we can turn from
the dictionaries to the history books in search of an answer.

A HISTORICAL VIEW OF PROBABLE CAUSE
"A natural starting point for those trying to solve the various puzzles of the Fourth Amendment, including the meaning
of probable cause, is in the English and American colonial
past." 13 Unfortunately, a number of recent scholarly examinations of the Fourth Amendment in general, and probable cause
in particular, have despaired of finding a definitive answer.
Craig S. Lerner, in The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, concludes that "the precise phrase [probable cause] appears to
have been relatively uncommon in colonial practice,"14 and
that when the phrase was used, "far from being a single standard, [probable cause] seems to have been a variable one, both
across time and within a given time period." 15 For example,
within the seventeenth century Coke "argued that a warrant
could issue only after an indictment and not upon what he
termed 'bare surmise[,)' [but] [t]his view was forcefully and
repeatedly criticized in the mid-seventeenth century by Matthew Hale." 16

12

Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925).
Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV.
951, 972 (2003).
1
•
Id. at 979.
15
Id. at 978.
16
Id. at 974 (footnote omitted).
13
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In The Birth of Probable Cause, 17 Jack K. Weber traces
the earliest first-hand discussion of probable cause to Bracton's
writings in the late thirteenth century, but concludes that
"Bracton's concepts are bundled together in an imprecise way.
There are no supporting cases and we cannot pin down from
his generalizations the precise level of information needed in
each instance." 18 Rather than provide a precise definition of
probable or adequate cause, Weber leaves us with a rather
amorphous standard that he says represents the "horse sense
of the ages," a theme that reappears in one of the current approaches to probable cause as a matter of "common sense." 19
From its origins until the enactment of the Fourth
Amendment, probable cause seems to have remained in a state
of flux. 20 The historian William Cuddihy has contrasted various enactments of the First Congress of the United States
which embraced differing thresholds for the issuance of search
warrants. 21 The Collection Act of 1789 created a low evidentiary standard for the issuance of a warrant, removed altogether a
magistrate's discretion to refuse a warrant, and largely insulated the officer from suit if the search failed to uncover evidence
of crime. 22 By contrast, The Excise Act of 1791 created a higher evidentiary burden, invested magistrates with the discretion
to refuse warrants and was far more liberal in affording those
searched with civil remedies. 23
In The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 24 David A.

17
Jack K Weber, The Birth of Probable Cause, 11 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 155
(1982).
18
Id. at 161.
19
See infra text accompanying notes 168-69.
20
In 1766, George Mason protested against a British statute's use of the term
"probable Cause of Complaint," because the word probable was "a word before an
unknown in the Language and Style of Laws!" Lerner, supra note 13, at 979
(quoting Letter from George Mason to the Committee of Merchants in London
(June 6, 1766), in 1 PAPERS OF GEORGE MAsON 65, 67 (Robert A. Rutland ed.,
1970)).
21
William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning
1550 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School).
22
Cuddihy, supra note 21, at 1527.
23
Id. at 1528, 1543.
24
David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 1739 (2000).
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Sklansky issues a broad challenge to the Court's new found
emphasis on common law history and its failure to recognize
that common law rules of search and seizure were both hazier
and less comprehensive than the Court has suggested. Professor Sklansky is particularly critical of
how Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas speak in their recent
Fourth Amendment opinions. To find the rule 'at common law'
they look sometimes to cases, sometimes to statutes, sometimes to commentaries. They refer interchangeably to authorities from the 1600s and 1700s-and sometimes also from the
1800s and early 1900s. They mix together English and American materials. 25

Professor Sklansky maintains that even if there were an
accepted common law definition of probable cause, and it appears there was not, most of those who ratified the Constitution and adopted the Bill of Rights were not lawyers, and they
would have been unlikely to view probable cause as a term of
art. In fact there is little evidence that most of them had mastered the common-law rules of search and seizure, let alone
endorsed them.
[D)uring the debates ... over ratification of the proposed Constitution, those concerned about the search-and-seizure powers of the federal government consistently called for an
amendment restraining those powers ''within proper bounds,"
or forbidding "all unreasonable searches and seizures." No one
proposed a constitutional ban on searches and seizures "contrary to common law," or "currently illegal under state
law." 26

These recent historical inquiries suggest that the first
failing of Fourth Amendment history is its inability to provide
a clear meaning for the term probable cause. But an even more
serious shortcoming of this type of historical inquiry is the
realization that even if we could learn with certainty what the
common law meant, there remains the fundamental ques-

25
26

Id. at 1795.
Id. at 1792 (footnote omitted).
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tion-"So what?" Prior to Justice Scalia's "originalist" approach
to the Fourth Amendment, the Court had informed us that
(t]he common-law rules governing searches and arrests
evolved in a society far simpler than ours is today. Crime has
changed, as have the means of law enforcement, and it would
therefore be naive to assume that those actions a constable
could take in an English or American village three centuries
ago should necessarily govern what we, as a society, now
regard as proper. 27

A reluctance to adopt common law history as the sine qua
non of Fourth Amendment interpretation appears frequently in
Supreme Court cases decided in the 1980s. For example, in
Tennessee u. Garner, 28 the Court acknowledged that it "has not
simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement
practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's
passage."29 The Garner Court found the use of deadly force to
stop all fleeing felons "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, despite common-law approval of the practice. 30 The old
rule, the Court concluded, no longer made sense. In the past
decade or so, however, Justice Scalia has replaced the Court's
hesitance to follow common law precedent with a strict
"originalist" approach to constitutional interpretation. His approach maintains that "the principal criterion for assessing
whether searches and seizures are 'unreasonable' within the
meaning of the Constitution is whether they were allowed by
eighteenth-century common law."31 "This new form of Fourth

27
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981). "The Bureau of
Justice note[d) that as of 1996, there were more than 700,000 police officers in
the United States, which is roughly one police officer for every 400 citizens."
Lerner, supra note 13, at 1019 n.452 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census
of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 1996 (1998)). In contrast, in 1811
there was one constable in England for every 18,187 persons. Jerome Hall, Legal
and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566, 582
(1936).
28
471 U.S. 1 (1985).
29
Garner, 471 U.S. at 13 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591
n.33 (1980)).
30
Id. at 14.
31
Sklansky, supra note 24, at 1739.
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Amendment originalism breaks dramatically . . . with the
ahistoric approach of the Warren and Burger Courts . . . [and]
with an older tradition of using the background of the Fourth
Amendment to illuminate not its precise demands but its general aims. "32
Judge Richard Posner has been particularly critical of this
"originalist" approach, suggesting that it is a sham, with a
"judge ... do[ing] the wildest things, all the while presenting
himself as the passive agent of the sainted Founders-don't
argue with me, argue with Them."33 Whether or not one
agrees with Judge Posner's criticism, the Court has demonstrated an uncanny ability to simultaneously select and ignore
relevant common law precedent. For example, in California v.
Hodari D., 34 the majority adopted the common law definition
of a seizure of a person as requiring either an actual touching
or a submission to a show of authority. 35 Thus, an escaping
suspect is not seized so long as he continues to flee. The dissent, however, urged the Court to look "not to the common law
of arrest, but to the common law of attempted arrest."36 Although a common law arrest required either touching or submission, the common law also recognized that "an officer might
be guilty of an assault because of an attempted arrest, without
privilege, even if he did not succeed in touching the other."37
The majority countered, however, that "neither usage nor common-law tradition makes an attempted seizure a seizure. The
common law may have made an attempted seizure unlawful in
certain circumstances; but it made many things unlawful, very
few of which were elevated to constitutional proscriptions. "38

32

Id.
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 251 (1995). Professor Tribe also cautioned against using the passive voice which "makes it look as though someone
out there, unspecified, is doing it to us. Admit that it's we who are doing it."
Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a
Pseudo-scientific Sieve, 36 HAsTINGS L.J. 155, 170 (1984).
34
499 U.S. 621 (1991).
35
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628.
36
Id. at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37
Rollins M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201 (1990) (citing
Gold u. Bissell, 1 Wend. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
38
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 n.2.
33
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The Hodari D. majority did not explain why it had selectively incorporated common law arrests into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, while refusing to assimilate common law
concepts of attempted arrests. 39 Recognition of a common law
arrest as "the quintessential 'seizure of the person' under our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudencen4° does not mean that the
Court must banish common law prohibitions of attempted arrests to the trash bin of peculiar historical practices that cannot be "elevated to constitutional proscriptions."4 1 After all,
intrusion into residential dwellings is the prototypical search
specified in the Constitution, 42 but the Court has extended
Fourth Amendment coverage to commercial premises,43 automobiles,44 and quasi-public areas like telephone booths. 45
In the final analysis Fourth Amendment history appears to
fail us on two counts. First, it does not provide a clear, precise
or even commonly accepted definition of probable cause. 46 Second, the common law's judgments about search and seizure are
necessarily time-bound by the era in which they arose. They
may provide limited guidance, but they are not dispositive of
modern day search and seizure issues.
[W]e make a serious mistake to accept the belief that the past

39

The Court has adopted an abridged version of the Amendment's history . . . . This truncated view of history simply does not reflect the
Framer's thoughts about the Fourth Amendment's constitutional meaning.
In sum, the Court has ignored the complexity of the Fourth Amendment's
origins, and as a result has denied itself and the nation the potential
benefits of a comprehensive historical inquiry.
Tracy Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 973 (2002).
0
'
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624.
41
Id. at 626 n.2.
" See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980).
43
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
« California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 0985).
46
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
•• Even Justices Scalia and Thomas may be abandoning their focus on history
and common law. See Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1298 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating "it is possible that neither the history of the Fourth Amendment nor the common law provides much guidance" in discussing the relationship
between the Amendment's two clauses).
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has done its work for the present, and that our liberty, which
is the cornerstone of democracy, is guaranteed. The truth is
that one generation can never protect the rights of another,
and although all of our great documents: the Declaration of
Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, are
ideal reflections of our finest aspirations, they are not self-fulfilling chariots of justice. For all their beauty, they are only
words, dependent on each generation to give them a meaning
and content for its own time and place. 47
JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF PROBABLE CAUSE-PIGEONHOLING
WITHOUT CROSS-REFERENCING

"'The substance of all the definitions' of probable cause 'is a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt."148 In Texas v. Brown, 49 a
four person plurality declared that this reasonable belief need
not be "correct or more likely true than false. A 'practical,
nontechnical' probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required."50 A majority of the Court has
never explicitly held that probable cause is less than a preponderance of the evidence, and the Court has been inconsistent in
the few decisions where it has addressed the burdens of proof
that apply to various Fourth Amendment issues. The prime
example of this troubling approach is Maryland v. Buie, 51
where the Court managed to be both opaque and inconsistent.
When discussing the Fourth Amendment standard of proof
that applies to a protective sweep of the defendant's premises,
the only clear aspect of Buie was the Court's rejection of "an
unnecessarily strict Fourth Amendment standard" requiring "a
protective sweep to be justified by probable cause to believe
that a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger existed
52
"
It is difficult, however, to decipher the following pas47

Sol Wachtler, Our Constitutions-Alive and Well, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
381, 387 (1987).
•• Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (emphasis added) (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)).
•• 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
•• Brown, 460 U.S. at 742.
1
•
494 U.S. 325 (1990)
•• Buie, 494 U.S. at 336-37.
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sage in which the Court formulates the correct standard to be
applied:
The type of search we authorize today ... may be conducted
only when justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on
the arrest scene. . . .
. . . The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited
protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when
the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on
specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene. 53
Within a couple of sentences, the Court referred to the
standard of proof as both reasonable suspicion and reasonable
belief. One of the few areas of clarity involving probable cause
is the Court's recognition of a hierarchy of certainty, i.e., probable cause requires a greater degree of likelihood than does
suspicion. The clarity arises primarily from logic and linguistics, not from the Court's sometimes cavalier use of the terms
belief and suspicion. As a logical matter, any distinction between reasonable suspicion and reasonable belief must rest on
the meaning of the words suspicion and belief, not on the
meaning of the identical modifier-reasonable. Common usage
of the terms belief and suspicion also accords with the Court's
placement of these terms within a scale of certainty. For example, Webster's defines "believe" as having "a firm conviction" or
"to consider to be true," 54 while suspicion involves merely
"slight evidence" or "uncertainty."55 When the Court uses the
terms suspicion and belief in a consistent manner, we have the
tools for distinguishing two constitutional levels of certainty. 56
In contrast, when the Court states that searches, seizures and

53

Id. at 337 {emphasis added).
WEBSTER'S, supra note 7, at 101.
65
Id. at 1174.
66
In most contexts, the court uses the term probable cause "to refer to a
quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search, to be distinguished from
a lesser quantum such as 'reasonable suspicion."' Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.

°'

868, 877 n.4 (1987).
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temporary detention must all be based on "reasonable
grounds," any distinction between degrees of likelihood is lost
in a muddled consideration of the "totality of the circumstances."
The useful distinction between belief and suspicion was
emphasized in Richards u. Wisconsin, 57 in the discussion of
the justification required for "no-knock" entry. 58 The Court
held in Richards that the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence would be
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction
of evidence. 59 The Court explained that its choice of the standard of reasonable suspicion "--as opposed to a probable-cause
requirement-strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of
search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected
by no-knock entries."60 Richards is one of the few cases in
which the Court effectively cross-referenced and contrasted the
levels of certainty required by suspicion and belief (probable
cause). Buie, on the other hand, blurred the distinction by interchanging the terms reasonable suspicion and reasonable
belief. Whether that blurring rests upon a slip of the pen, or
the Court's failure to adhere to its prior distinction between
suspicion and belief, we can register our legitimate concern
over the Court's lack of precision when discussing the level of
certainty required by the Fourth Amendment.
The Court's tendency to pigeonhole, but not cross-reference, degrees of certainties is also reflected in its discussion of
the inevitable discovery doctrine. The question of whether illegally seized evidence likely would (inevitably) have been discovered by lawful means is akin to the nature of probable
cause, i.e. whether evidence to be seized likely will be discovered by a lawful search. Despite the ambiguity surrounding the

67

520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
Richards, 520 U.S. at 394.
s• Id.
60
Id. (emphasis added).
68
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forward looking nature of probable cause,61 Nix v. Williams 62
was clear with respect to the backward-looking nature of the
inevitable discovery doctrine. 63 Nix required the government
to meet the more-likely-than-not standard in order to avail
itself of the inevitable discovery doctrine. 64 In fact the only
debate in Nix was whether to adopt the preponderance standard or the higher standard of "clear and convincing evidence."
The Nix dissent argued for the clear and convincing evidence
standard because "[i]ncreasing the burden of proof serves to
impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and
thereby reduces the risk that illegally obtained evidence will be
admitted."65
If the risk that unjustified searches and seizures will occur
is substituted for the risk of admitting illegally obtained evidence, the Nix dissent's argument for a high standard of proof
could be transposed to the probable cause requirement. After
all, a higher standard of certainty would seem most needed
when authorizing future searches that may well impact on
innocent people. 66 In contrast, Nix involved a situation where
the past search produced clear evidence of the defendant's
guilt.67 The higher standard adopted in Nix is particularly sur-

61

The Court has stated:
[T)he protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments "can only be
realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as
to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement."
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "CaseBy-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma,
1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142).
62
467 U.S. 431 (1984).
63
Nix, 467 U.S. at 431 (addressing a violation of the Sixth Amendment).
64
Id. at 444. Evidence will not be excluded "[i)f the prosecution can establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means . . . ." Id.
65
Id. at 459-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66
See generally, Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Deuice for
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983).
67
Nix, 467 U.S. at 434-35. Protection of the innocent against unreasonable
searches and seizures would be largely a prospective matter, because, as a practical matter, the trial court will be determining probable cause in a suppression
hearing where the seized evidence is likely to be damning. The higher standard
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prising in light of the Court's expressed hostility to the truth
defeating nature of the exclusionary rule. 68 Had the Court
thought to compare the levels of certainty required for probable
cause and for "inevitable discovery," it might have been surprised at what it had wrought. If, however, the Court sees a
symmetry in the standards of certainty it requires from the
government, we would all benefit from an articulation of that
symmetry. To date, the Court has not only failed to define the
level of certainty that constitutes probable cause, the Court has
failed to explain the underlying principle governing its choice
among standards such as suspicion, belief, preponderance, and
clear and convincing. 69
A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH TO PROBABLE CAUSE

In Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, Professor Laurence H. Tribe gave us one view of the
evolutionary role mathematics has played in the legal system:
The system of legal proof that replaced trial by battle in
Continental Europe during the Middle Ages reflected a starkly numerical jurisprudence. The law typically specified how
many uncontradicted witnesses were required to establish

in Nix is aimed, in part, to protect against the attractiveness of 20-20 hindsight
(e.g., "of course our police department is competent and would have found the
evidence"). A court's determination of probable cause is likely to be influenced by
hindsight in a similar way, and thus requires similar protection by a similar
standard of proof.
68
As Professor Akil Amar suggested:
[S)hould not the law strongly presume that somehow, some way, sometime, the truth would come out? Criminals get careless or cocky; conspirators rat; neighbors come forward; cops get lucky; the truth outs; and
justice reigns--<>r so our courts should presume, and any party seeking to
suppress truth and thwart justice should bear a heavy burden of proof.
Amar, supra note 6, at 794.
69
The Court has also used the phrase "reasonable probability" when determining violations of constitutional discovery rights. In that context, the Court has
stated that a material violation "does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted unlimitedly
in the defendant's acquittal . . . . A 'reasonable probability' of a different result is
accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial.'" Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434
(1995) (citations omitted).
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various categories of propositions, and defined precisely how
many witnesses of a particular class or gender were needed to
cancel the testimony of a single witness of a more elevated
order. So it was that medieval law, nurtured by the abstractions of scholasticism, sought in mathematical precision an
escape from the perils of irrational and subjective judgment.
In a more pragmatic era, it should come as no surprise
that the search for objectivity in adjudication has taken another tack. Yesterday's practice of numerology has given way
to today's theory of probability, currently the sine qua non of
rational analysis. 70

The continuing development of modern science has fostered
a desire to quantify legal doctrines such as probable cause. Soft
facts and "mushy" legal concepts increasingly are seen as inferior to hard facts and objective analysis, and concrete statistical
infer'ence is to be preferred to intuitive judgment. Thus, some
urge that law in general and probable cause in particular
should be made amenable to mathematical formulation. 71
The judiciary, however, has cautioned against being seduced by the allure of objectivity and precision in mathematics.
"Mathematics, a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society,
while assisting the trier of fact in the search for truth, must
not cast a spell over him. "72 In its most comprehensive discussion of probable cause, the Supreme Court stated that "an
effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to 'probable cause' may not be helpful .... "73
Instead, probable cause remains "a fluid concept ... not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set oflegal rules."74
If we seek to find the appropriate middle ground between
being the master or slave of mathematical precision, we must

70
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1329 (1971) (footnote omitted)
71
"[T)he question inevitably arises in any discussion of probable cause: just
how probable? There is the vague impression that, if law were truly a serious
enterprise, the answer would be amenable to mathematical form." Lerner, supra
note 13, at 995.
72
People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968).
73
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983).
74
Gates, 462 U.S. at 232.
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consider three questions: (1) Should mathematical probabilities
be used as evidence to meet the standard of probable cause, at
whatever level of certainty the standard is set? (2) To what
extent should mathematical probabilities replace or compliment
intuitive appraisals? (3) Should probable cause be expressed as
a mathematical likelihood?
USE OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

All proof is ultimately "probabilistic" in the sense that no
conclusion can ever be drawn from empirical data without some
step of inductive inference. The question is whether to bring
this probabilistic element of inference to explicit attention in a
quantified way, i.e., in overtly probabilistic evidence.
Perhaps the most common type of overtly probabilistic
evidence involves base rates which are defined as the relative
frequency with which an event occurs or an attribute is present in a population. The base rate for an event or attribute
equals the probability that it will be present in any randomly
selected member of the reference class prior to the introduction of case-specific or individuating information. 75

For example, in the airplane hypotheticals at the start of this
article, the base rate is a 50% probability that any particular
passenger is guilty. The question of probable cause might be
resolved at this point purely on the basis of probability theory-a legal determination that a 50% likelihood constitutes
adequate probable cause to arrest and search. Yet the law
seems uncomfortable with relying wholly on base rates and
making the leap from aggregate likelihood to a conclusion of
probable cause in a specific case. 76 "Background evidence is

75
Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing
Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 252 (1990).
76
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 943 (1984), Justice Brennan cautioned that "personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages." See also
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2164
(2002) ("Current Fourth Amendment law discourages group seizures. . . . Aggregate justifications-no one person is reasonably suspected, but the odds are high
that some members of the group are criminal~o not suffice.").
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considered somehow inferior to evidence that is individuating
and specific to the case at hand."77
In our hijacking hypothetical, non-mathematically based
probable cause might be satisfied by case-specific evidence like
the flight attendant's claim that she could recognize all ten
voices she heard on the plane. After some minimal assurances
that she was reasonably confident of her ability, the police
might utilize her voice identifications to sort the ten suspects
into the likely guilty and the likely innocent. Suppose, however,
that the police disdained case-specific facts and used additional
statistics to sort the suspects according to who most closely
matched a profile of hijackers. In a crude example, the police
cite a study establishing that people from Middle-Eastern countries are ten percent more likely than the general population to
hijack a plane. Should the law of probable cause distinguish
between the overtly probabilistic hijacker profile and the casespecific voice identifications made by the flight attendant? Why
should there even be a question of discounting the starkly numerical likelihood reflected in the profile, when no one questions establishing probable cause based upon circumstantial
evidence or statements from witnesses or informants of doubtful credibility? 78
One objection to relying on statistical likelihoods is that
arresting or searching based solely on a bare probability (i.e.,
favorable ''betting odds") wrongfully "gambles" with a citizen's
liberty or privacy. Thus, the argument goes, law enforcement
authorities should be barred from searching or seizing on the
basis of bare statistics. 79 This claim ignores the reality that a
similar gamble exists whenever there is any doubt about the
defendant's guilt, regardless of whether the doubt arises from
statistics or case-specific evidence. After all, how sure is the

77

Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 75, at 262.
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 378
U.S. 410 (1969).
79
The "[a)uthority of police officers to spy on occupants of toilet
booths-whether in an amusement park or a private home-will not be sustained
on the theory that if they watch enough people long enough some malum prohibitum acts will eventually be discovered." State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800, 801
(Minn. 1970)
78
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flight attendant that she can distinguish ten voices, and how
sure are we of her professed ability to make such distinctions?80 All evidence is probabilistic, requires inferences to
support an ultimate conclusion, and thus involves a risk of error. Statistical evidence is different only in that it makes these
uncertainties explicit. Society cannot avoid "gambling" with
citizens' liberties unless one hundred percent certainty becomes
the prerequisite to arrests and searches. Any aversion to gambling with a defendant's liberty and privacy suggests raising
the burden of proof for all cases. "It does not support a special
rule for statistical-probability cases."81
A second objection to relying on statistical likelihoods is
that arresting or searching based wholly on a bare statistical
probability violates the principle that citizens should be treated
as unique individuals. 82 The profiling evidence in the hijacking
hypothetical focuses not on a suspect's own attributes, but on
background information that describes the statistical attributes
of a broader class of individuals, i.e., residents of Middle-Eastern countries. An unavoidable feature of probabilistic thinking
is that it treats people as members of a group rather than as
individuals. Some commentators suggest that this focus violates an ethical command to treat citizens as unique individuals and to judge them only on evidence about their own conduct
or matters within their own control. 83 We should, the argu-

80

The flight attendant may have first-order uncertainty, e.g., she may be 60%
sure of her identification of any voice. The police, however, may have a secondorder uncertainty if they are only 50% confident of her ability to distinguish
among the voices. Empirical studies suggest that people making judgments and
decisions generally take both first-order and second-order uncertainty into account.
Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 75, at 251.
81
Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 538 (1989).
82
Some fear that using numerical terms leads to "the dehumanization of the
legal process." Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1147 (1987).
83
One commentator has stated that
the Fourth Amendment is the commitment to treating persons who come
before the law on the basis of their individual, particular, uncommon, and
odd property and attributes. Juristic procedures which help show the
unique characteristics of individuals and actions to the decision-maker
provide the factual evidentiary base for legal judgments which avoid ab-
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ment goes, apply to the search and seizure phase the instinctive reluctance to convict and punish a person based on statistical evidence that the defendant is one among many, or even a
few, who could have committed the crime. 84
Of course we all know that innocent people are sometimes
convicted by an imperfect criminal justice system. But deliberately sacrificing an innocent person, by say, convicting all ten
passengers on our hypothetical airplane, seems worse than
simply acknowledging a long-run statistical chance of unjust
convictions. As an analogy, consider the difference between a
suicide bomber and a volunteer for a suicide mission where
death is highly likely, but not certain. Western society views
the latter as an act of heroism, while generally condemning the
former. Yet, however much society seeks to prevent the ulti~
mate conviction and punishment of the innocent, the concept of
probable cause accepts that some innocent people will be required to surrender their liberty or privacy at the early investigative stages of search and seizure. 85
Once we acknowledge that innocents may be searched and
seized, any differentiation between "individualized" case-specific evidence and "statistical" evidence is largely illusionary. For
example, what was suspicious about the conduct observed in

stract moral structures and remain useful as explanations of external
phenomena.
Gary A. Ahrens, Privacy and Property: Can They Remain After Juridical Personality ls Lost?, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1077, 1082 (1977) (footnote omitted).
The law's respect for autonomy counsels focusing on factors that can be controlled by the suspect whose liberty and privacy are to be set aside. "The citizen
who has given no good cause for believing he is engaged in [transportation of contraband) is entitled to proceed on his way without interference." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949).
84
This instinctive reluctance was the focus of Professor Nesson's prisoner
hypothetical. See supra note 5. "Group guilt can be both immensely powerful and
deeply troubling when used to punish people or focus suspicion on them merely
for their associations . . . ." David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor
in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes;
Prediction, No, 73 MISS. L.J. 423, 451 (2003) (emphasis added).
•• Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), "accepts the risk that officers may stop
innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that risk in connection
with more drastic police action; persons arrested and detained on probable cause
to believe they have committed a crime may turn out to be innocent." Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000).
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Terry v. Ohio, where Officer McFadden observed two men take
turns walking down the street to stare into a window twentyfour times, conferring with each other after each trip. 86 Preswnably Officer McFadden's past experience provided him with
a generalized view of how innocent shoppers act. The suspects
observed by Officer McFadden did not fit this unscientific profile of an innocent shopper. The point was well illustrated in
the following hypothetical:
Assume that the Cleveland Police Chief asked Officer
McFadden and other similarly experienced officers to address
a class of new recruits at the police academy on the topic,
"What to Look for in Preventing Burglaries." Could a recruit
take notes at this lecture and then rely on the experience of
Officer McFadden and Officer McFadden's colleagues to justify the recruit's own reasonable suspicion in making future
stops?87

If the answer to the question is yes, it is difficult to conclude
that hijacker profiles cannot be used because they are not individualized. "[T]he suspicion underlying the detention of a person believed to be a potential criminal is often based on police
experience with previous crimes under similar circumstances ...."88 Thus, like other decision-makers, police inevitably
act on stereotypes derived from their experience.
The explicit use of profiles or other statistical compilations
in searches and seizures mirrors the type of probabilistic
thinking that increasingly appears in many areas of the law.
For example, sentencing guidelines and "three strikes and
you're out" laws treat offenders as members of a group rather
than as unique individuals. Thus, all offenders with three requisite convictions who are sentenced on a new offense are considered to pose a similar risk of recidivism and to warrant
similar sentences. Such an assessment ignores, or gives little
weight to, a particular offender's individuality. Instead, the
86

Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.

87

JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIETY SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 225 (1985).
88

Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 U.C.L.A

L. REV. 1, 83 (1991).
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three-time offender is judged, as would be a person matching a
profile, on the behavior of others in his group. 89 Although
"three strikes" laws are relatively recent developments, Professor Morgan Cloud has examined some largely ignored historical
practices that led him to conclude that "the Founders of our
constitutional scheme accepted some seizures based upon group
identity as necessary responses to national crises. n9o
Those who criticize sentencing guidelines, profiles and
other stereotyping, seem to take as a given that stereotyping
always works to the detriment of the individual, whereas
treating people as individuals always works to the benefit of
the individual. 91 Yet, one might wonder whether persons who
lost their liberty or privacy because of the exclusion of statistical evidence would derive much solace from being "treated as a
unique human being." In our hijacking hypothetical, suppose
the same profile that attributed a ten percent likelihood of guilt
to suspects from Arab countries, indicated that there was a
ninety-nine percent likelihood that citizens of Iceland would
not hijack a plane. If the police treat Arabs and Icelanders
alike, will the Icelander applaud such equality, or claim reverse
discrimination favoring Arabs in spite of the Icelander's empirically superior score on the hijacker profile?
When statistical studies uncover disproportionate offending
rates among a distinct group, simple efficiency [not racial or
ethnic prejudice] points toward devoting greater law enforcement resources to this disproportionate group. 92 Efficiency
89
See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne'er-Do- Well to the Criminal
History Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 99 (2003).
90
Morgan Cloud, Quakers, Slaves and the Founders: Profiling to Saue the Union, 73 MISS. L.J. 369, 418 (2003).
91
But see William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J.
2137, 2169 (2002) ("Some marginal substitution of group searches for individual
ones is very likely to raise the quality of police treatment of suspects even as it
raises the ability of the political process (instead of the courts) to regulate policing. These are real social gains.").
92
"All nineteen of the suicide hijackers of September 11 were from one narrow demographic group: they were young Muslim men from the Arab world. How
could it not make sense to target our enforcement efforts at these same people?"
Harris, supra note 84, at 426-27 (2003). Professor Harris ultimately concluded
that racial profiling "is a legal, moral and practical dead end." Id. at 428.
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considerations become particularly relevant if hijacker profiles
and other screening measures are seen as promoting deterrence, 93 not just apprehension of the guilty. In particular,
viewing the war on terrorism as a preemptive rather than
reactionary endeavor suggests that profiles and screening measures may be the best way of insuring that terrorism never succeeds. The specter of hijacker profiles and airport screening is
more likely to deter would-be-terrorists than is the fear that
they will be betrayed by case-specific facts such as someone
spotting a bomb fuse protruding from their tennis shoes. 94
There are of course many valid objections to profiling,95
but these objections involve policy considerations independent
of the empirical validity of the profiles. 96 Although the law
generally seeks to maximize factual accuracy, criteria other
than error minimization also must be considered. The rules of
evidence governing logical and legal relevance are particularly
instructive in this regard. At trial, a fact-finder motivated solely by the interest in factual accuracy considers all logically
probative evidence. 97 Similarly, if the only function of probable
cause is to ensure an accurate factual determination, then

93

See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552, 557 (1976) (stating an individualized suspicion requirement at roadblocks "would largely eliminate
any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though
smugglers are known to use these highways regularly").
•• When the goal is deterrence, insistence on case-specific facts becomes problematic because the goal is to prevent such facts from developing, i.e., to prevent
potential threats at an early stage before they become mass disasters. If the government must wait until sufficient case-specific facts develop, its goal of deterrence has been frustrated.
95
See generally Symposium, The Permissibility of Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of a Search or Seizure, 73 MISS. L.J. 365
(2003).
96
Racial profiling is a repugnant practice "not because it is irrational (in the
sense of statistically inaccurate) but because it flouts the moral principle that it
is wrong to judge an individual using the statistics of a racial or ethnic group.
The argument against bigotry, . . . [is) a rule of ethics, that tells us when to
tum our statistical categorizers off." STEVEN PINKER, How THE MIND WORKS 313
(1997).
97
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID.
401.
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scientifically valid profiles cannot be discounted. 98 Legal relevance, however, introduces the type of extraneous policy considerations that may counterbalance the interest in logical validity,99 and Courts are often called upon to exclude probative
evidence in order to serve important social goals. Within the
context of the Fourth Amendment, we need look no further
than its exclusionary rule, which excludes probative evidence
and thus, presumably reduces factual accuracy. Application of
the exclusionary rule recognizes that, at times, the quest for
factual accuracy must be subordinated to the policy interest in
deterring violations of the right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizure. Similarly, when assessing the use of
profiles, it is valid to ask whether their logical relevance is outweighed by the social costs of permitting police to target people
based on factors such as race or ethnic origin. 100 However,
any reluctance to permit police to engage in profiling should
not be based on a blanket rejection of the factual reliability or
social costs of all profiles. Surely, with all the various profiles
that abound, 101 some are scientifically valid while others are

98
J.C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof,
14 VAND. L. REV. 807, 817 (1961) (stating the proper standard of proof is the one
that causes the smallest number of mistakes); David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34, 35-36 (1979) (noting the
only question in deciding whether to apply probability theory to legal fact-finding
is "whether the technique would reduce the number of errors in the fact fmding").
99
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403.
100
Courts have differed as to whether race or ethnicity can be considered as
at least one piece of evidence establishing probable cause. Compare United States
v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) ("As it is, . . . facts are not to
be ignored simply because they are unpleasant-and the unpleasant fact in this
case is that [the police officer] had knowledge . . . that young . . . black Los
Angeles gangs were flooding the Kansas City area with cocaine."), with United
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The likelihood
that in an area in which the majority-<>r even a substantial part-of the population is Hispanic, any given person of Hispanic ancestry is in fact an alien, let
alone an illegal alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic appearance a relevant
factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.").
101
Just a few of the currently used profiles include: airline highjackers, drugcouriers, alien smugglers, battering parents, serial killers, and those who make
school-shooting threats.
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not; 102 some create social costs that outweigh their benefits,
while others do not. 103
In summary, when the police in our hijacking hypothetical
seek to supplement their information by consulting a hijacker
profile, two separate objections may be raised. First, is the
profile empirically valid, and second, do the efficiency gains
from profiling outweigh the impact that this type of post-September policing imposes on people of Middle-Eastern origin? As
to the first consideration, statistical probability evidence, "while
neither a panacea nor devoid of problems, is relevant to the
truth of asserted facts, and indeed is no less relevant in
principle than case-specific evidence." 104 A fifty percent probability of guilt based entirely on statistical information carries
with it the same chance of inaccuracy as a fifty percent probability of guilt based on, say, the ability of a flight attendant to
recognize and distinguish ten voices. All evidence contains a
risk of error; overtly probabilistic evidence simply makes the
risk more visible. Thus, a decision to rely on the flight
attendant's ability to distinguish voices is no more or less speculative than deciding whether to rely on statistics. The difference between unacceptable speculation and reasonable inference is not a logical distinction, but a legal judgment. Speculation describes a category of doubts that fail to establish probable cause, while reasonable inference describes a category of
doubts acceptable within the concept of probable cause. 105

102
For instance, according to one study conducted by the Drug Enforcement
Administration, between forty and fifty percent of those identified as drug couriers pursuant to a profile turned out to be carrying either illegal drugs or other
evidence connecting them with the illegal drug trade. See MONAHAN & WALKER,
supra note 87, at 226-27 (citing ZEDLEWSKI, THE DEA AIRPORT SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF AGENT ACTIVITIES (1984)). Compare Justice Marshall's
criticism of the drug courier profile used in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
13(1989) (Marshall J., dissenting).
103
"Reasonable people can differ about the balance, but one could plausibly
conclude that the efficiency gains from profiling outweigh the harm" of race-conscious policing. See Stuntz, supra note 91, at 2179.
104
Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 75, at 278.
105
"Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing
their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts
leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability." Brinegar v. United States,
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As to the second consideration regarding the social costs of
profiling, the law has never permitted the quest for factual
accuracy to trump all other values; thus, both case-specific and
statistical evidence may be excluded for policy reasons. For
example, in Winston v. Lee, 106 the Court observed that "[a]
compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence . . . implicates expectations of privacy and security of
such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even
if likely to produce evidence of a crime." 107 All other policy
values being equal, however, there is no reason to favor casespecific facts over statistical evidence such as profiles. Correctly
applied, mathematical expressions of probabilities can assist, if
not exclusively control, probable cause determinations.
ACCOMMODATING MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITIES
AND INTUITIVE APPRAISALS

We live in an uncertain world of probabilities ranging from
the possible/probable actions of subatomic quarks to the possible/probable physics taking place below the event horizon of
black holes. Our task is to develop strategies for management
of uncertainty-in the small universe of the Fourth Amendment-to manage the level of uncertainty surrounding probable
cause.
In Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 108 Professor Barbara D. Underwood explained that prediction can be
made in a variety of ways, such as by use of individualized
judgment based on case-specific facts, or by use of formulas
that assign fixed weights to predetermined characteristics of
the person matching a profile. Arguments abound for the superiority of either method, and for the extent to which the choice
of one method precludes use of the alternative method.
Those who favor individualized assessment would ignore

338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
106
470 U.S. 753 (1989).
107
Winston, 470 U.S. at 759 (emphasis added).
108
Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behauior with
Statistical Inference and Indiuidualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1978-79).
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available statistical evidence because they prefer to trust the
subjective judgment of experienced decision makers who evaluate each individual situation in light of accumulated experience. Such experienced observers may rely on perceptions that
they cannot articulate as explicit rules or mathematical probabilities, what Professor Underwood refers to as "the gap between intuitive individualized judgment and statistical inference."109
Professor Joseph Grano once offered an explanation of why
the law of probable cause should insist on case-specific facts
and discount statistical evidence. He posed a hypothetical in
which the police could establish, based on case-specific facts,
that one of ten people must be guilty of a specific crime. Thus,
"for any suspect selected at random from the group, the odds
are only ten percent that he is guilty but a whopping ninety
percent that he is innocent." 11° Conceding that at first blush
ten percent certainty might seem too low for probable cause,
Professor Grano suggested that
[s]uch a probability analysis, however, distorts our perspective. It causes us to overlook the success of the police in narrowing their investigation from the universe of all possible
suspects, which may include much of the population, to ten
individuals. In a modern, mobile society, this should be seen
as a rather significant accomplishment. 111

He concluded that there is probable cause to arrest each suspect because "[h]aving narrowed the universe of possible suspects to ten, the community would not be unreasonable in requiring all ten, nine of whom are presumably innocent, to sacrifice some liberty or privacy to solve the crime." 112
Professor Grano then distinguished the arrest of another
group of ten based solely on a statistical showing that random
searches of people on city streets would show one of ten pos-

109

Id. at 1429.
Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the
Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 496 (1984).
111
Id. at 497.
112 Id.
110
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sesses a concealed weapon or narcotics. 113 Professor Grano
maintained that this random search is unacceptable because,
"under the [F)ourth [A]mendment, it is one thing to demand
some sacrifice of liberty or privacy when suspicion has focused
on an individual; it is another to demand such sacrifice when
no cause whatsoever exists to believe that the individual, as
opposed to anyone else, is involved with crime." 114 I confess
that Professor Grano's distinct treatment of these two
hypotheticals escapes me, as does his characterization of a ten
percent statistical likelihood as "no cause whatsoever." Why is
this statistical probability of ten percent any less valid probable
cause than the same ten percent likelihood established by casespecific facts? 115 There are other reasons for objecting to random searches, but in assessing likelihoods, one ten percent
probability is as good as another.
The strongest argument against random searches is that
they resemble the general warrants and writs of assistance
that the framers of the Fourth Amendment sought to prohibit.116 English custom inspectors relied upon general warrants
to search whomever and wherever they pleased, but today's
government officials might achieve the same result by replacing
general warrants with statistical likelihoods that are readily
available or easily created. Thus, searches based wholly on
statistics could infringe upon the rights of large numbers of
innocent people. However, the very nature of probable cause
assumes that some innocents must lose their privacy or liberty
in order to further law enforcement needs. The proper question
is how many must surrender their rights, not what type of

113

Id. at 498.

u, Id.
115
Id. If one of Professor Grano's rationales for upholding the case·specific arrests was to reward police for narrowing "much of the population" to ten suspects, why not reward police for researching statistics and narrowing suspects to
those who are on city streets as opposed to those who are on suburban streets or
home in bed?
116
"The drafting process of the Fourth Amendment reinforces the conclusion
that suspicionless searches and seizures pursuant to general warrants were the
initial and primary evils sought to be prevented." Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of
Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizure,

25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 527 (1995).
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factual inference or statistical likelihood leads us to demand
that surrender, i.e., does it matter whether innocent people lose
their liberty because of case-specific facts like driving the same
model and color car as the bank robber, 117 or whether they
lose liberty because they are walking on public streets that
statistics point to as likely to involve certain crimes? The upsetting aspect of arresting on a ten percent likelihood of guilt is
that nine innocents are being sacrificed to apprehend one guilty
party. These "odds" are equally unacceptable whether the odds
are computed on the basis of statistics or case-specific facts.
This is best illustrated by retaining Professor Grano's distinct
methods of determining the odds of guilt in his hypotheticals,
but changing the odds themselves. For example, suppose police
investigation of specific facts points to one of the ten people as
possessing drugs, while random searches of people on city
streets would show seven of ten possess narcotics. My choice
between these two hypotheticals would be the exact opposite of
Professor Grano's choice. I would prefer sacrificing three innocents on the basis of statistics, to sacrificing nine innocents
based on the "success of the police in narrowing their investigation ... to ten individuals."
Whatever the resolution of hypotheticals like Professor
Grano's or my hijacking hypothetical, practical considerations
are also said to point toward preferring intuitive individualized
judgment over statistical inferences. Because few police officers,
magistrates, and judges are accustomed to statistical ways of
thinking and reasoning, they are likely to experience difficulty
in translating relevant evidence (statistical or otherwise) into
numerical probabilities. There is always a danger that one's
opinions and judgments may be altered when they are restated
numerically. Some commentators thus favor what they term

117
Insisting on case-specific facts is no guarantee against intrusions on the
rights of a great number of innocent people. In Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721, 722 (1969), the case-specific facts were the rape victim's "description of her
assailant . . . [as) a Negro youth." These facts led to the police taking at least
twenty-four African-American youths to police headquarters where they were questioned briefly, fingerprinted, and then released without charge. Do.vis, 394 U.S. at
722. The police also interrogated forty or fifty other African-American youths
either at police headquarters, at school, or on the street. Id.
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"intuitive"' decision making strategies that reflect how statistically untrained people actually make decisions. They argue
that "intuition"' is internally coherent and preferable to
probabilistic logic in the event of conflict. 118
Recognizing that most police officers cannot express their
intuitive judgements in terms of explicit probabilities, however,
does not dictate that all logic be abandoned in favor of police
consulting entrails and witch doctors when determining probable cause. 119 Even when fact-finders do not make explicit or
precise probability estimates about issues, their decisions are
often grounded in implicit estimates. For example, in Delaware
v. Prouse, 120 Justice White relied upon his intuitive appreciation of the likely statistical impact of random automobile stops.
He explained that, "[i]t seems common sense that the percentage of all drivers on the road who are driving without a license
is very small and that the number of licensed drivers who will
be stopped in order to find one unlicensed operator will be
large indeed." 121 Similarly, both common sense and statistics
tell police that young men commit a hugely disproportionate
number of crimes. Police factor this into their assessment of
probable cause even if they cannot quote precise percentages.
The crudeness of the intuitive probabilistic determinations
currently used to determine probable cause can be improved
through use of tools like probability assessment procedures and
other mathematical techniques. 122 Police can be expected to
improve their assessment of probabilities if they are formally
trained in probabilistic appraisal techniques. One frequently
118

Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 75, at 266.
"The difficulty of practicing an art is no excuse for practicing it stupidly,
carelessly." JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE 222 (2d prtg. 1950) (1949).
120
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
121
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1979).
122
Properly done statistical analyses are hardly less reliable than the intuitions, unfounded assumptions and guesswork on which the courts and police
often rely. See generally Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information
Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'V REV. 123, 146
(1980-81) ("[T]he decision maker whose only tool is intuition will often err . . . .
It has been well established for some time now that when the same information
is available to intuitive humans or a good mathematical model, the human's decisions are consistently less accurate.").
119
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cited justification for not using statistical evidence at trial is
that unsophisticated juries can be misled by pseudo-scientific
probability analysis. 123 But unlike juries who come and go
with little or no training, police can be familiarized with the
proper methods of assessing probabilities. When searches and
seizures are based on objectively scored factors such as statistics, whatever may be lost in terms of regard for individual
autonomy could be compensated for by an increase in terms of
uniformity and neutrality.
If mathematical precision is not always to be preferred
over unstructured intuition, at a minimum, mathematical probabilities can supplement traditional methods of assessing probable cause. The practical question that remains is to how often
will such statistics be available in the real world of search and
seizure. This question surfaced last year in the oral arguments
on Maryland v. Pringle. 124 More so than any other case,
Pringle provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
relate probable cause to mathematical probabilities.
The facts of Pringle were fairly straight-forward:
In the early morning hours a passenger car occupied by three
men was stopped for speeding by a police officer. The officer,
upon searching the car, seized $763 of rolled-up cash from the
glove compartment and five glassine baggies of cocaine from
between the back-seat armrest and the back seat. After all
three men denied ownership of the cocaine and money, the
officer arrested each of them. 125

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that "the mere finding
of cocaine in the back armrest when [Pringle] was a front seat
passenger in a car being driven by its owner is insufficient to
establish probable cause for an arrest for possession. "126 The
U.S. Supreme Court ultimately upheld the arrest because
it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise

123

See People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968).
124 S. Ct. 795 (2003).
Pringle, 124 U.S. at 798
128
Pringle v. State, 805 A.2d 1016, 1027 (Md. 2002), rev'd Maryland v.
Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003).
12
•
120
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among the three men. The quantity of drugs and cash in the
car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to
which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person
with the potential to furnish evidence against him. 127

Although Pringle was ultimately decided on the "common
enterprise" theory, most of the oral arguments 128 had proceeded on the assumption that only one of the three occupants of
the car was guilty. Thus, the arguments explored the question
of whether a one in three chance of guilt constituted probable
cause. Government counsel argued that probable cause could
not be expressed in mathematical terms, while defense
counsel's opening argument suggested "this is a unique case
with highly unusual facts" which starkly presented probable
cause in a numerical fashion. The Court, however, saw it differently: "You make an interesting opening statement that this is
highly unusual-we've-a lot of us read a lot of these cases. It
seems to me this happens all the time, that drugs in the car,
the person says, it's not mine. It seems to me that that's common place." 129
Not only was the particular factual situation in Pringle
commonplace, but the availability of statistical probabilities is
also much more common than is often realized. Automobile
search cases in particular seem to abound with readily available and relevant statistical information. In Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 130 the Court was asked to discount case-specific facts
and the concept of personal autonomy when ruling on a police
practice of ordering all motorists out of their vehicles "as a
matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic
violation." 131 The Court addressed this uniform practice without inquiring whether the individual police officer had any
case-specific information that a particular motorist was likely
127

Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 801.
See infra text accompanying notes 155-56.
129
Oral arguments at 32-33, Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003) (No.
02-809), auailable at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument
_transcripts/02-809. pdf.
130
434 U.S. 106 (1977).
131
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110; see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)
(permitting police to order all passengers out of the vehicle)
128
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to be armed and dangerous. 132 The Court ultimately concluded that uniform treatment of motorists as a class was justified
by statistical evidence "that a significant percentage of murders
of police officers occur[] when the officers are making traffic
stops." 133 The Court's holding was influenced by one study
concluding that approximately thirty percent of police shootings
occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in
an automobile. 134
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 135 the
Court upheld sobriety roadblocks when informed that approximately 1.6 percent of the drivers passing through the checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment. 136 In addition, an
expert witness testified at the trial that experience in other
states demonstrated that, on the whole, sobriety checkpoints
resulted in drunken driving arrests of around one percent of all
motorists stopped. 137 When the Court subsequently distinguished Sitz in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 138 the Court noted
that the overall "hit rate" of the program in Edmond was reported as approximately nine percent-about five percent of
stopped cars in drug checkpoints led to drug arrests and another four percent led to arrests for other offenses. 139
In Delaware v. Prouse 140 a majority of the Court accepted
the government's contention that random stops furthered a

132
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109. The state conceded that "the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the particular driver at the time of the stop, there
having been nothing unusual or suspicious about his behavior." Id.
133
Id. at 110. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973)).
134
Id. at 110.
135
496 U.S. 444 (1990)
136
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
1a1 Id.
138
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
139
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34-35; see also United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 557 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting one
physician's estimate "that he had found contraband in only 15 to 20 percent of
the persons he had examined"); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (noting the ratio of illegal aliens detected to vehicles stopped was approximately 0.5 percent, and data established that .12% of those initially stopped and
20% of those referred to a secondary checkpoint were illegal immigrants).
1 0
•
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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"vital" state interest in promoting highway safety 141 and indicated its willingness to uphold the searches if "in the service of
these important ends the discretionary spot check is a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon
Fourth Amendment interests which such stops entail."142 The
state, however, was unable to offer any statistics to prove its
claim that random stops are more efficient than the less intrusive checkpoint stops formerly used by the authorities. 143
Prouse thus found the state's practice unconstitutional on· the
basis of the state's inability to demonstrate that the method
was "sufficiently productive" in relation to less intrusive but
more efficient means of serving the government's purpose. 144
In addition to automobile cases, statistical evidence is often
used to establish the effectiveness of airport screening programs, 145 as well as the reliability of human informants 146
and drug sniffing dogs. For example, United States v.
Limares 141 held that probable cause was clearly established
when the record revealed that the drug sniffing dog had been
right sixty-two percent of the time. 148 Even when such precise
statistics are unknown or forgotten, there often remains a
vague awareness of their general thrust. In one of the most
famous cases of our era-the 0. J. Simpson case-Professor

141

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658-60.
Id. at 659.
143
Id. at 658.
144
Id. at 659.
145
For example,
[i)n the 15 years the [Government's airport screening) program has been
in effect, more than 9.5 billion persons have been screened, and over 10
billion pieces of luggage have been inspected. By far the overwhelming
majority of those persons who have been searched . . . have proved entirely innocent-only 42,000 firearms have been detected during the same
period.
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989).
145
The reliability of informants is often established by citing specific numbers
establishing their "track record" of past accuracy. See, e.g., United States v.
Shepard, 714 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 1983) ("(O]n approximately thirty earlier
occasions the informant had provided information that had led to over twenty-five
convictions.").
1 7
269 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2001).
•
145
Limares, 269 F.3d at 798.
142
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William J. Stuntz suggested that the "officers undoubtedly
knew what Justice Department statistics indicate: that half of
the women murdered in the United States are killed by their
husbands or boyfriends. Simple probabilities made Mr.
Simpson a suspect." 149
In summary, statistical evidence is readily available in
many cases and should be utilized whenever it exists. When it
is not available, there would be a powerful incentive to discover
or create such statistics if the Court announced its preference
for statistical evidence over unstructured intuition. 150 As suggested earlier, police could be trained in probability assessment
techniques, and this training could include not only how to
"think like a statistician," but how to gleam percentages from
arrest files and other police records. 151 Creating data banks
showing where past efforts have been most and least productive could help establish the probability of guilt in particular
types of recurring situations. 152
If the courts were to accept that mathematical probabilities
have a role to play in determining probable cause, the remaining area for consideration is the extent to which the probable
cause standard itself should be expressed in mathematical
terms.
THE LEVEL OF CERTAINTY-PLAYING BY THE NUMBERS?

149
William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantiue
Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 846 (2001) (quoting Scott Turow,
Policing the Police: The D.A. 's Job, in POSTMORTEM: THE 0.J. SIMPSON CASE:

JUSTICE CONFRONTS RACE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, LAWYERS, MONEY, AND THE ME-

189, 189-90 (Jeffrey Adamson ed., 1996).
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 131 n.6 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Statistical studies of bystander victimization are rare. One study attributes this
to incomplete recordkeeping and a lack of officially compiled data.").
1 1
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 135 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the United
•
States Department of Justice announced that it would appoint an outside monitor
to ensure that New Jersey State Police keep records on racial statistics and traffic stops).
152
"When the Government's interest lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct,
a low incidence of such conduct, far from impugning the validity of the scheme
for implementing this interest, is more logically viewed as a hallmark of success."
United States v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989).
DIA

150
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The law's principal task is decisionmaking, and
decisionmaking takes place in a world of uncertainty. A central and critical task ... is to specify the degree of certainty
or likelihood required to support a particular decision. 153

Although they turned out to be a mere tease, the oral arguments in Maryland u. Pringle dramatically framed the question
of expressing probable cause in mathematical terms. When
government counsel asserted that a one in three chance of guilt
satisfied the probable cause standard, the following exchange
occurred:
Court: Why do we call it probable cause?
Counsel: I think there's a bit of a misnomer there, but clearly
from the case law of this Court, it means a fair probability ...
Court: But if you had to reduce it to a percentage figure,
what would you call the percentage required for probable
cause? 154
Counsel: I don't know that I could, Your Honor. I really don't
know that it's useful to Court: But it's less than 50, though, I gather?
Counsel: Yes. Your-the cases of this Court has said Court: So that takes care of the two people in the room, but
when you get down to 33-113 with three people?
Counsel: I think-I think three people clearly would be Court: And with four people it would be 25 percent. Is that
enough?
Counsel: Probably, probably....
Court: ... [Y)ou agree that at some point the probability iswhen the numbers of people present keep increasing, at some
point the probability is going to be too slim? 155

53
'
154

Clermont, supra note 82, at 1117 (footnotes omitted).
When asked to quantify the degree of certainty represented by the phrase
"probable cause," 166 federal judges gave, as an average response, 45. 78%. C.M.A
McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1327 (1982). They also equated reasonable suspicion with a 31.34% level of certainty. Id. at 1327-28.
155
Oral arguments at 14-15, Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003) (No.
02-809), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument
_ transcripts/02-809. pdf.
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At another point the Court stated, "you know, it gets worse
and worse," what if there are ten people in a mini-van or bus
"so the chance that any individual one did it is ten percent.
That's still enough [probable cause]?" 156
Pushed down that slippery slope by the Court, counsel's
only lifeline was the Court's own statements that probable
cause could not be quantified. 157 But when the Court states
that probable cause resists definition, the Court is not saying
that it is logically impossible to attach a probability value to
probable cause. The question is not whether the law of probable cause can be precise, but whether it ought to be precise.
"Although nothing in probability theory determines the choice
of a probability value for probable cause, nothing in the notion
of probability prevents the assignment of a specific probability
value to the legal requirement of probable cause. "158
The previous sections of this article focused on the methodology for determining probable cause, (i.e., whether police
should utilize statistical studies), and the extent to which police
should be encouraged to compile statistical records and to analyze situations in an overtly probabilistic way. At this point,
however, the concern is no longer about which methodology, as
an empirical matter, will generate the highest degree of certainty. The focus now shifts to the degree of certainty required
by the Constitution. As a substantive legal standard, probable
cause is independent of the methodology used to assess factual
likelihoods.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has often confused the
method of determining factual likelihoods with the constitutionally required degree of certainty. Consider the definition of
probable cause in Carroll u. United States: 159 "If the facts and

158
Id. at 13. Professor Grano once asserted that ten percent was enough to
establish probable cause. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
157
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) ("[P]robable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.").
158
Peter Tillers, Intellectual History, Probability, and the Law of Evidence, 91
MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1484 (1993).
159
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man
of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been
committed, it is sufficient."160 This definition specifies a methodology for arriving at probable cause-use prudence and caution-but merely describes the ultimate arrival point as a "belief' that the offense has been committed. The question that
remains is how strong must that belief be in order to satisfy
the constitution?
Meeting that question head-on would require the Court to
provide a reasonably precise [perhaps mathematically precise]
answer, and at times the Court has acknowledged that the first
principle of Fourth Amendment interpretation is that the constitutional standard must be "workable for application by rank
and file, trained police officers." 161 As Professor LaFave put it,
Fourth Amendment doctrine
is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day
activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are
readily applicable by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A
highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs,
ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances
and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon
which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but
they may be "literally impossible of application by the officer
in the field. "162

Formulating rules that are clear in application, however,
says little about the substance of those rules. "Don't search on
Thursdays" is a clear rule furthering privacy interests; "search
all teenagers who are in public after 11 p.m." is a clear rule
diminishing privacy. Does the Fourth Amendment have noth-

160

Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161.
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 0983). Dunaway u. New York, 422
U.S. 200, 213·14 (1979), held that "[a] single, familiar standard is essential to
guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances
they confront." Departures from such a standard should be adopted, the Court
added, reluctantly, and only in "narrowly defined" circumstances. Dunaway, 422
U.S. at 213-14.
162
LaFave, supra note 61, at 141 (footnotes omitted).
161
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ing to say about the desirability of these equally clear rules?
Once the Court settles on the conditions under which a search
or seizure may occur, we would all hope that the Court will be
as lucid as possible in defining the contours of such reasonable
searches. This is mom and apple pie stuff, and the police do not
have a unique perspective in preferring clarity over ambiguity .163 But if clarity is all that the police want, 164 one very
clear rule would be-"when in doubt, don't search"-or at least
don't search when the level of doubt drops below an acceptable
risk of error.
The problem with quests for clear rules defining probable
cause is that
any attempt to achieve certainty regarding any important
constitutional issue is unlikely to succeed and-even if it does
succeed in the short run-will inevitably create uncertainty
as to more issues than it settles. The process of rendering a
decision will tend to distort the issue decided as well as the
applicable precedents and doctrines. 165

Thus, the Court has acknowledged that because so many variables exist in the probable cause equation, "one determination
will seldom be a useful 'precedent' for another." 166 In the end,
even seemingly "bright-line" rules usually become blurred as
the police and the adversarial process test their outer limits,
and "[t]he grail of'rule-oriented' jurisprudence is as mythical as

163
"[A) body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and
when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in
words." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
186 (1920).
164
Professor LaFave did not advocate clarity as the sole or dominant consideration, but instead argued that clarity plays a role in the calculus of balancing
government and individual interests. He suggested that a rule theoretically correct
only 95% of the time, but understandable in virtually all cases is preferable to a
rule that is 100% theoretically correct, but which police could correctly apply only
75% of the time. Wayne R. LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court:
Further Ventures into the "Quagmire, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 30 n.76 (1972).
165
Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986
DUKE L.J. l, 2.
166
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.11 (1983).
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King Arthur's." 167
The inability to formulate clear rules or precise probability
levels governing probable cause has lead the Court to adopt one
over-arching rule for the police-just use your common sense
and act reasonably. In an imperfect world where correct answers are uncertain, a "pragmatic" Court recognizes that it
must muddle through to the best of its ability, and that it can
hardly ask more from the police. Thus, the Court often determines the constitutionality of police conduct "by resorting to a
malleable 'objective' test of reasonableness viewed from the
police officer's perspective,"168 and "any police conduct that is
'understandable' in the circumstances according to common
sense [will] be judged 'reasonable' for purposes of assessing the
constitutionality of police intrusions." 169
As formulated in Terry v. Ohio, 170 the legal standard becomes whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment
of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." 171
The Terry Court was misguided, however, in its suggestion that

167

Slobogin, supra note 88, at 71.
Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 199, 265 (1993); see also Phyllis T. Bookspan,
Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44
VAND. L. REV 473, 477 (1991).
Although the (F]ourth [A)mendment conveys to "the People [the right) to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" the reasonableness
approach focuses on the acts of the police instead of the rights of the
people. The question, then, becomes whether the police acted reasonably
rather than whether a person's rights were violated. This approach endorses retrospective evaluations of police behavior rather than prospective
protections.
Id. (footnote omitted).
169
Thomas Y. Davis, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v.
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and
Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1991); see
also Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 (stating probable cause "does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about
human behavior; jurors as factfmders are permitted to do the same--and so are
law enforcement officers.").
110
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
171
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
166
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a police officer could choose the constitutionally appropriate
action by employing a common sense, seat-of-the pants assessment. 172 The crucial mistake in Terry was using the word
"reasonable" as a term of art synonymous with constitutionality, and at the same time, a description of the searching
officer's rational analysis of the situation. By equating reasonableness as a process of logical thought with reasonableness as
a standard of constitutionally permissible behavior, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment are reduced to a prohibition against irrational police actions. As Justice Stevens
charged, the Court acts "on the assumption that the constitutional protection against 'unreasonable' seizures requires
nothing more than a hypothetically rational basis for intrusions
on individual liberty." 173
If taken seriously, deference to the reasonably prudent
police officer's common sense is "an invitation to reviewing
courts to treat a police intrusion as 'reasonable' if any explanation for the police conduct can be given." 174 Admittedly, this
approach requires something more than whimsy or caprice by
police officers, 175 but even a five percent likelihood that

172
Terry's statement regarding a belief "that the action taken was appropriate"
is a meaningless generality to the police officer on the street. Wayne R. LaFave,
Street Encounters and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REV. 39, 64 (1968). But see Stuntz, supra note 91, at 2175. However,
Stuntz states that
[n]o one knows how to craft a legal formula that will tell officers how to
behave in advance. That problem, however, need not be solved; vagueness
in legal definitions is a more tolerable vice than law professors tend to
think. The problem that needs addressing is not definition but application-the question is not whether we can come up with the right legal
terminology, but whether police officers can know roughly where the
boundaries are in practice. Maybe they can. "I know it when I see it" has
a bad reputation in legal circles, but the reputation is undeserved. Sometimes, consider-all-the-circumstances standards work tolerably well in spite
of their linguistic muddiness-for all the muddiness, bottom lines may be
reasonably predictable.
Id. at 2175.
173
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 422 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
m Davis, supra note 169, at 57.
175
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543 (1985) (noting
customs inspectors had more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch"). "The clear incentive that operated in the past to establish probable cause
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seizable items are present in the place to be searched establishes that the basis for the search is rational and not wholly
arbitrary. Allowing police to act on such minimal odds, however, would lead to an unacceptable number of unnecessarily
invasive and harassing searches and seizures. 176 The cost to
the victims of such unnecessary intrusions is obvious, but the
state also has an "economic" interest because "[t]he lower the
level of certainty required for a search and seizure, the more
state resources will be wasted in conducting it, since more
mistakes will occur." 177
Trusting probable cause determinations to a police officer's
common sense also runs contra to the intent of the framers of
the Fourth Amendment. Is it plausible they drafted the Warrant Clause and the probable cause requirement merely to
insure that the police had some minimally rational basis for
exercising their power?
It seems unlikely the Framers would have accepted that the
government can bestow generalized discretionary authority on
a police officer through the credential of a metal police
badge ... when they clearly would not have allowed the same
officer to be given the same generalized discretionary authority in the form of a paper general warrant. 178

Most importantly, deferring to the officer's exercise of common sense conflicts with the Court's view of the Fourth Amendment as requiring a delicate balance between the governmental
interest and the individual interest in privacy or liberty. Despite the Court's protestations that it balances interests only in

has now been so completely vitiated that the police need only show that it was
not 'entirely unreasonable' under the circumstances of a particular case for them
to believe that the warrant they were issued was valid." United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 957 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
176
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 133 n.8 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting in a two-year period, the "New York City Police Department Street
Crimes Unit made 45,000 stops, only 9,500, or 20%, of which resulted in arrest;"
"in 1997, New York City's Street Crimes Unit conducted 27,061 stop-and-frisks,
only 4,647 of which, 17%, resulted in arrest").
177
Slobogin, supra note 88, at 61 n.196.
178
Davis, supra note 169, at 53 n.203.
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"special need" cases, 179 or only where the probable cause standard does not apply, 180 the Court has never explained why it
sometimes uses balancing and sometimes uses rigid rules. 181
The Court's vacillation between a rigid definition of probable
cause and the ultimate flexibility of balancing has replaced its
bipolar approach to the relationship between the amendment's
warrant clause and the reasonableness clause. 182 Justice
Thomas' recent comment on that legendary schizophrenia can
be paraphrased to apply equally to the Court's vacillation on
probable cause: "Our cases stand for the illuminating proposition that [probable cause is a uniform standard], except, of
course, when [it is] not." 183
Stripped of qualifiers, modifiers, and outright obfuscation,
the true essence of the Court's overall approach is that '"the
balancing of competing interests' [is] 'the key principle of the
Fourth Amendment."' 184 Probable cause is but one of many
forms or. levels of justification for reasonable searches and
seizures, and it would be a strange jurisprudence that utilized
the balancing of government and individual interests for all
constitutional intrusions except those based on probable cause.
The very idea of balancing implies that each side has some
merit; that some privacy interests outweigh some government
interests; and that all forms of privacy cannot be set aside
merely because the government offers a modicum of rational
justification for the intrusion. Determining which justifications
are sufficient for which types of intrusions requires something

179

Slobogin, supra note 88, at 25.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) (stating that because the
balancing test of Terry v. Ohio "involved an exception to the general rule requiring probable cause, this Court has been careful to maintain its narrow scope").
m Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis M. Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 22 (1988) (noting the Court's failure to explain when it balances and when it uses rigid rules).
182
See generally Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment's Two Clauses,
26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389 (1989).
183
The original statement was: "Our cases stand for the illuminating proposition that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, except, of course, when
they are not." Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1299 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
184
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981)}.
180
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other than ostensibly value-free objective rationality on the
part of police officers. For example, the police officer in Tennessee v. Garner acted rationally, but unreasonably in the constitutional sense, by using deadly force against a non-dangerous
fleeing felon. 185 The use of such force was rational because it
had been approved by common law and adhered to by a majority of modern police departments. 186 Nonetheless, its use became constitutionally unreasonable in cases involving nondangerous felons, 187 because the balance was now to be struck
in favor of an individual's right to life, which outweighed
society's interest in effective law enforcement.
Judicial balancing of the conflicting considerations in Garner, Terry, and other Fourth Amendment cases furthers one of
the images of how justice is done, i.e., one case at a time, taking into account all the circumstances, and identifying within
that context the right outcome-reasonableness under the circumstances. 188 But the reasonable or fair result in a particular case is but one of a number of competing values. Often contradicting the quest for individual justice is the need for equal
treatment of similarly situated individuals, the need for comprehensible and stable laws to guide law enforcement officials,
and the larger concerns of general society. 189 It is impossible
for the Supreme Court to maintain its institutional concern for
general principles and to remain totally responsive to the pecu-

185

Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
Id. at 12.
187
Id. at 11 (stating deadly force may be used only "(wJhere the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical
harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to
prevent escape by using deadly force").
188
The genius of the common law, so the theory goes, was that by sticking
close to the facts of the case, the law would grow and develop, not through the
pronouncement of general principles, but case-by-case, incrementally, one step at a
time. The meaning of the rule emerges, develops and changes in the course of
applying it to specific facts.
89
'
"[T)he law does undoubtedly treat the individual as a means to an
end . . . . " OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). "[J]ustice to
the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of
the scales." Id. at 41.
188
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liarities of each case. 190
Although the Court cannot avoid the dichotomy between
uniform application of law and responsiveness to individual
situations, between universe and context, between sameness
and difference, the Court can achieve an accommodation. The
accommodation I suggest is twofold: 1) the fiction of one uniform definition of probable cause must be replaced with a flexible sliding scale that takes account of the severity of the intrusion and the magnitude of the threat; and 2) the amorphous
approach of balancing the totality of the circumstances must be
replaced with a fixed number of structured categories reflecting
multiple layers of probable cause. The goal of this suggested
approach is to achieve an appropriate or at least workable
blending of flexibility and calibration.
FLEXIBILITY

"Decision theorists insist that the problem of choice always
involves two questions: (a) What are the odds?, and (b) What's
at stake?"191 We cannot settle on an appropriate level of probable cause [the odds] until we can assess the importance of the
interests at stake. On any scale of importance, the interests in
the two airplane hypotheticals at the start of this article must
be seen as poles apart. Terrorists and illegal smokers are both
criminals, but hardly constitute the same threat to society.
When computing the odds for probable cause, it seems obvious
that a low level of probability should suffice when the stakes
involve a terrorist threat. Conversely, we would expect that a
high level of probability must be satisfied when the stakes are
limited to the possible escape of an illegal smoker.
Despite this obvious truism, the Court often clings to the

190
The Court's prime institutional task is to deal with issues of significant
public interest, not merely to do justice to the particular parties of the relatively
rare case in which certiorari has been granted.
191
Barbara J. Shapiro, "Beyond Reasonable Doubtn and "Probable Causen: Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence, 91 MICH. L. REV.

1465, 1486 (1983).
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fiction that probable cause is a "single, familiar standard,"192
and that distinctions among crimes are irrelevant when it comes to regulating criminal investigations. 193 This rigid view of
probable cause requires the police to pinpoint their level of
certainty to some fixed, but undefined, percentage that applies
equally to illegal smokers and terrorists. In contrast to the
rigidness of probable cause, the reasonable suspicion standard
of Terry has evolved into a variable standard, calibrated to the
degree of both the privacy intrusion and the state interest.
Thus, reasonable suspicion is "not simply a lower standard
than probable cause, but a different kind of standard." 194 The
flexibility exemplified in the balancing approach of Terry is an
appropriate model for an expanded definition of probable cause
that would take account of the severity of the suspected crime.
In Judge Posner's words, "probable cause-the area between
bare suspicion and virtual certainty--describes not a point but
a zone, within which the graver the crime the more latitude the
police must be allowed." 195
One objection to calibrating the level of probable cause
according to the severity of the suspected crime is the difficult
timing considerations facing courts and police. At the time
most searches and arrests take place, the police do not know

192
Dunaway u. New York, 422 U.S. 200, 213 (1979), rejected "a multifactor
balancing test" of reasonable police conduct under the circumstances, because a
"single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests
involved in the specific circumstances they confront."
193
In Brinegar u. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), Justice Jackson stated
that
we must remember that the authority which we concede to conduct
searches and seizures without warrant may be exercised by the most
unfit and ruthless officers as well as by the fit and responsible, and resorted to in case of petty misdemeanors as well as in the case of the
gravest felonies.
Id. at 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
1
. . Lerner, supra note 13, at 1002.
195
Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1566 (7th Cir. 1985) (en bane); see
Amar, supra note 6, at 784 ("To begin with, probable cause cannot be a fixed
standard. It would make little sense to insist on the same amount of probability
regardless of the imminence of the harm, the intrusiveness of the search, the
reason for the search, and so on.").
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precisely what crime occurred. In contrast, by the time a court
rules on the constitutionality of a search, the litigants typically
have established the nature of the alleged crime with precision.
The contrast between the initially suspected crime and the
offense subsequently discovered can be drastic. By way of illustration, consider the following two situations. First, upon hearing loud screams from an apartment, a police officer concludes
that someone's life is in immediate danger. He breaks down the
door, follows the screams, and finds an uninhibited couple
making love. Second, a police officer outside an apartment
building detects an odor he believes is the smell of burning
marijuana. He rushes into the apartment and finds that the
odor comes from a decomposing body. In both situations, the
court faces almost unbearable pressure to evaluate the
government's justification for initiating the search in light of
the facts known at trial. 196 In the latter situation, the court
might wish to deter overzealous and faulty investigations of
marijuana smoking, but it requires a truly Herculean effort to
suppress evidence of a dead body. Conversely, the court might
prefer to encourage the first officer's concern for saving lives,
but it is difficult to overlook this intrusion into the marital
bedroom. Thus, the criticism goes, factoring the severity of
crimes into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would only compound the dangers of hindsight judgment which inhere in the
remedy of exclusion of evidence at trial.
Although this criticism is valid, it is not impossible to overcome. Courts routinely struggle with excluding reliable evidence because of legal rules holding such evidence to be inadmissible. For example, evidence that a defendant committed
crimes similar to the crime currently charged at trial must be
excluded unless some exception applies, such as showing that
the previous crimes establish the modus operandi used in the
current charge. It may be distasteful for a trial judge to exclude

196
"[A]fter-the-event justification for the . . . search (is] too likely to be subtly
influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." Beck v. Ohio, 379

U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
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a defendant's lengthy rap sheet, 197 but no more or less so
than requiring the judge to focus exclusively on what police
suspected pre-search, regardless of what we now know. As to
the difficulty of police making pre-search evaluations-i.e., asking them to classify cases by the severity of the underlying
crime before the details of the crime are known-rough estimates or classifications of suspected crimes are everyday occurrences when police and prosecutors decide where to put their
investigative resources. "All police forces and all prosecutors'
offices make up-front judgments about the seriousness of alleged crimes."198 A concept of probable cause that recognizes
four or five classes of crimes ranging from the most serious to
the least, would not require police or courts to make unmanageably complex judgments. 199
A more theoretical objection to weighing the severity of the
suspected crime is that the Fourth Amendment would become
unique in lowering constitutional rights when society's interest
is strong.
For example, the state's admittedly great interest in solving a
murder does not permit a relaxation of the right to remain
silent, the right to jury trial, the right to counsel, or- most
analogous to the subject of the present discussion-the burden of proof; if anything, given the greater consequences that
flow from a murder conviction, we are more protective of
these rights in homicide cases. 200

One way to avoid this objection, or at least diminish its impact,
is to return to the original concerns that led the Terry Court to
create a new form of justification and a lower level of certainty

197
The exclusion of probative evidence in order to serve some other policy is
by no means unique to the Fourth Amendment. Dean Wigmore devoted an entire
volume to such exclusionary rules of evidence. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (J.
McNaughton rev., 1961) (discussing, inter alia, marital privilege, attorney-client
privilege, communications among jurors, state secrets privilege, physician-patient
privilege, priest-penitent privilege).
198
Stuntz, supra note 149, at 870.
199
For example, courts and police would find the following categories fairly
easy to distinguish: violent crime; nonviolent, nondrug crime; serious drug crime;
and less serious drug crime. Id.
200
Slobogin, supra note 88, at 52.
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for a seizure. Terry focused not on solving past crimes, but on
preventing an impending crime and protecting against future
harm to a police officer. "[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative
stops before crimes are committed . . . . [W]hereas probable
cause looks for past or present illegalities, an underlying purpose of Terry is to grant officers the ability to prevent future
wrongdoing. "201 When future danger is significant, the
government's interests expand to include protection of the community as well as solving past crimes. 202
The amount of information that prudent police will collect
before deciding to make a search or an arrest, and hence the
amount of probable cause they will have, is a function of the
gravity of the crime, and especially the danger of its imminent
repetition. If a multiple murderer is at large, the police must
compress their investigation and make the decision to search
or arrest on less information than if they could investigate at
their leisure. 203

Perhaps the best example of the benefits and pitfalls of
distinguishing between past and future harm is the Sirhan 204
case in 1968, where society faced a possible terrorist threat,
before the word terrorist became a familiar part of our collective consciousness. At approximately midnight on June 4, 1968,
Senator Robert Kennedy, a candidate for the Democratic Presi-

201
United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
No. 04-5795, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 544 (2005).
202
Consider this "thought experiment" posed by Professor George Thomas:
Suppose the authorities on the evening of September 10 had a choice
between foiling the plot and causing the terrorists to flee or arresting all
nineteen hijackers after the planes had done their destruction. (I have no
idea how this would be possible, but it is only a thought experiment).
George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race and a New Approach to Consent Searches,
73 MISS. L.J. 525, 536 (2003). Professor Thomas concluded that the dominant purpose should be to protect the public safety even if it meant that no one would be
arrested or convicted. Id.
203
Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1566 (7th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (emphasis
added).
204
People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1972), overruled by Hawans v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1978).
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dential nomination, was shot and killed by Sirhan Sirhan. 205
At 10:30 a.m. the next day, police entered Sirhan's house, without a warrant, 206 and "began 'a general search' ... to determine both 'whether or not there was anyone else involved in
[the crime]' and 'whether or not there were any other things
that would be relative to the crime.'"207 In the defendant's
bedroom, the police found a diary that was introduced at the
trial. 208
The warrantless "general search"209 of a private dwelling
and the seizure of a personal diary intruded upon the most
sacrosanct aspects of privacy. Balanced against these interests
were 1) the severity of the crime, and 2) the threat of a nationwide panic that could follow a political assassination. The Supreme Court of California upheld the search because
[t]he crime was one of enormous gravity, and the "gravity of
the offense" is an appropriate factor to take into consideration. The victim was a major presidential candidate, and a
crime of violence had already been committed against him.
The crime thus involved far more than idle threats. Although
the officers did not have reasonable cause to believe that the
house contained evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate prominent political leaders, we believe that the mere possibility
that there might be such evidence in the house fully warranted the officers' actions. It is not difficult to envisage what
would have been the effect on this nation if several more
political assassinations had followed that of Senator Kennedy.
Today when assassinations of persons of prominence have

205

Sirhan, 497 P.2d at 1126.
Id. at 1138.
07
'
Id. at 1141.
208
Id. at 1138.
209
The court noted that:
The scope of the search must, of course, be 'strictly tied to and justified
by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. . . . Even
if the exigent circumstances in this case made lawful a warrantless
search only for evidence of a possible conspiracy to assassinate prominent
political leaders, it is clear from the record that the officers were search·
ing for such evidence. Only a thorough search in the house could insure
that there was no evidence therein of such a conspiracy.
Id. at 1141 (citations omitted).
208
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repeatedly been committed in this country, it is essential that
law enforcement officers be allowed to take fast action in
their endeavors to combat such crimes. 210

No one can dispute the court's appraisal of the crime as
one of enormous gravity. But solving such a horrendous crime
does not necessitate dispensing with a warrant and lowering
the level of probable cause to a "mere possibility." The defendant had been caught in the act, gun in hand, in front of a considerable number of eye witnesses. With or without the seized
diary, there was little possibility that the defendant would be
acquitted. The true justification for the search lies in the
Court's recognition of the danger of continuing assassinations
of political leaders and the possible ensuing public panic. The
Sirhan Court took judicial notice that "only two months [before
the assassination of Senator Kennedy] Reverend Martin Luther
King, Jr., had been assassinated, and less than five years previously the victim's brother, President John F. Kennedy." 211
The court could have also added that the race riots in the
Watts section of Los Angeles had occurred within the past
three years, and that the summer of 1968 saw increased challenges (violent and peaceful) to the Vietnam War.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the particular result
in Sirhan, the court's concern for future harm provides some
guidance for resolving our hijacking hypothetical. The thwarted
hijacking in our hypothetical did not result in anyone's death,
and to that extent the past harm is distinct from the tragic
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy. But the major concern in the hypothetical (as in the Sirhan case) is whether
these would-be hijackers were an isolated group, or part of a
wide-scale attack that might still be unfolding. When imminent
damage to society is anticipated, the state may legitimately
point to a need for loosening investigative restrictions.
Of course we must guard against overreacting and seeing
terrorists plots behind every serious crime. Under current law,
because the threatened harm is not an element of the probable

210
211

Id. at 1140 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1140 n.18.
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cause analysis, the government never has to produce any hard
proof of alleged threats. Instead, the government often uses
veiled suggestions of serious harm, implicitly seeking a generous judicial approach to the government's search and seizure
powers. A humorous, but not atypical, example occurred during
the oral arguments for Maryland v. Pringle when the Court
asked whether it would be significant if the seized drugs had
been in a locked trunk rather than in the back seat of the
car. 212 Counsel responded: "[I]f there had been a large quantity of drugs in the trunk or if there had been a dead body in the
trunk .... "213 At least on this occasion, the Court instructed
counsel not to speculate in this manner-"Well, let's stick to
the five-these five bags that were stuck in a Ziploc bag. The
Ziploc bag is in the trunk, not a dead body."214 Although this
was a fairly innocuous illustration, history has multiple examples (ranging from the "communist menace" during the McCarthy era; to the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the
post-9/11 era) of the government's tendency to exaggerate and
manipulate perceived "threats" as justifications for expanding
government power and limiting individual liberty. What we
gain from placing threats of future harm within the calculus of
probable cause is the opportunity to force the government to
produce hard evidence of any perceived threat.
In addition to showing-not merely speculating-that a
specific, significant danger exists, the government should have
to demonstrate that the danger cannot be averted unless the
usual level of certainty is lowered. For example, when the Department of Home Land Defense obtained information of terrorists threats during the 2003 holiday travel season, the country was placed on heightened alert and several flights from
London to the United States were cancelled until further investigation could occur. This seems like an eminently sensible and
fair way to proceed, and preferable to sacrificing additional

212

Oral Arguments at 8, Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct 795 (2003) (No. 02809), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/02-809.pdf.
213
Id. at 9.
2
"
Id.
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passengers' rights as the only response to a possible threat.
Lowering the level of certainty required for searches and seizures should be reserved for the most serious and immediate
threats when the government has few, if any, alternatives. 215
If the threat is not immediate, then "[a]n alternative to all
modes of search is more police work: more interviewing of witnesses, more surveillance, more poring over documents, more
informer recruitment, more of whatever police do, other than
searching, to solve or create cases. "216 For example, when the
only threat of future harm is that a smoker might again smoke
in an airplane or other prohibited area, the police can act at
their leisure when investigating the case against the suspected
smokers.
Focusing on future versus past harm also helps avoid a
paradox that has sometimes arisen in the Court's analysis of
probable cause. In Winston v. Lee, the government sought a
court order to remove a bullet from the defendant's body so
that a ballistics test of the bullet could tie the defendant to a
thwarted burglary. 217 The Court recognized that such an extreme invasion of privacy should not be justified by the relatively low level of certainty required to satisfy ordinary probable cause. Instead, the Court examined whether there was a
"compelling need" for the removal of the bullet or whether the
prosecution had access to sufficient alternative methods of
proving guilt at trial. 218 In effect, the Court created another
form and level of probable cause which managed to hook the
government on the horns of a dilemma: if the facts were sufficient to establish a high degree of likelihood that the bullet was
present in the defendant's body, then these same facts, when
presented at trial, could circumstantially establish the location
of the bullet. Thus, there was no compelling need to actually
remove the bullet. The Court gave full effect to this paradox by

215
"[!Intuitively we agree that less antecedent cause should be required as the
need for the police conduct becomes more urgent." Grano, supra note 110, at 504.
216
Steven Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1418 (1986).
217
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 756 (1985).
218
Winston, 470 U.S. at 765-66. The Court considered whether prohibiting the
intrusion would affect "the community's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence." Id. at 762.
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holding that the government's strong circumstantial case without the bullet demonstrated that there was inadequate justification for such an extreme intrusion into the privacy of the
defendant's body. 219 The Court turned out to be correct because the defendant was ultimately convicted based on circumstantial evidence. 220 This type of analysis of the likelihood of
finding the evidence and the need for the evidence to prove a
past crime has only marginal relevance to the separate concern
for preventing future harm. For example, the paradox would
not exist if the government had compelling circumstantial evidence that a suspect had swallowed a capsule with the names
of terrorists planning a future attack, and the government now
sought court approval to forcibly extract the capsule.
To return to our hypotheticals once again, if the government has strong circumstantial evidence that a particular passenger is a smoker (e.g., tobacco smell on clothing, cigarette
lighter in briefcase, etc.), that evidence can be presented to a
jury, and the past crime of smoking on an airplane can be
proved without the need to search the passenger's house for
additional evidence that he is a smoker. In contrast, no matter
how strong the evidence is that a hypothetical terrorist is
guilty of attempted hijacking, even a slight indication of a wider terrorist plot might be adequate justification to search his
house in order to prevent future terrorists attacks.
In summary, the concept of adequate justification for
searches and seizures must be made flexible enough to take
account of the severity of the underlying crime, and even more
importantly, the severity of the threat of future harm. At some
point, the future danger may be so great that lessening constitutional protections might be necessary. As Justice Jackson
cautioned in another context, "[t]he choice is not between order
and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy with-

219
Id. at 765. "[A)lthough the bullet may turn out to be useful to the Commonwealth in prosecuting [Lee), the Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate a
compelling need for it. We believe that in these circumstances the Commonwealth
has failed to demonstrate that it would be 'reasonable' . . . to search for evidence
of this crime by means of the contemplated surgery." Id. at 766.
220
See Clyde Burrows, 10 Years Giuen Man with Bullet in Shoulder, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1985, at Al.
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out either. There is danger that, if the Court does not temper
its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact. "221
CATEGORIES

It is relatively easy to distinguish the severity of the past
crime and the future threat in the two airplane hypotheticals
at the start of this article. The difficult task that remains is to
draw the line or lines distinguishing and categorizing situations somewhere between these polar extremes. The difficulty
of the task inheres in its very formulation because to suggest
categories instantly gives rise to the question-how many categories? Two, three, forty? 222 As Professor Amsterdam put it
thirty years ago:
[A]ny number of categories, however shaped, is too few to encompass life and too many to organize it manageably. The
question remains at what level of generality and in what
shape rules should be designed in order to encompass all that
can be encompassed without throwing organization to the
wolves."223

We can seek guidance on categorization from the experts on the
psychology of decision making and from that ultimate legal decision maker-the Supreme Court.
Cognitive psychology examines "how we detect, transform,
store, retrieve, and use information from our environment. "224
In Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for
Standards of Decision, Professor Kevin M. Clermont reflects on
experimental investigations which indicate that humans have
built-in cognitive limitations, and that most of us can only
identify around seven distinguishable categories or a seven

221

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
"Using a larger number of categories might reap larger gains, as there are
always potential gains from fine-tuning legal rules. . . . It is true that too much
fine-tuning can be costly: consistency may suffer, and police may ignore or evade
the law if it becomes too complex." Stuntz, supra note 149, at 870-71 n.93.
223
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 377 (1974).
2
"' Clermont, supra note 82, at 1134.
222
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point rating scale. 225 In an effort to make sound probability
assessments better fit humans, not the impracticable reverse,
Professor Clermont has suggested that "the law usually does,
realistically can, and optimally should recognize only seven
categories of uncertainty in its standards of decision: (1) slightest possibility, (2) reasonable possibility, (3) substantial possibility, (4) equipoise, (5) probability, (6) high probability and (7)
almost certainty."226 With some slight tinkering, those seven
categories can be edited down to accord with what I believe are
five categories of certainty currently recognized by the Supreme
Court.
The initial editing involves discarding two levels of certainty on practical grounds. The first to go is "equipoise" because
the police need a standard of decision, not a standard of inaction where they are paralyzed by doubt. Also, as a practical
matter, situations where the facts on either side are in exact
equilibrium rarely appear in the real world of search and seizure where the police usually deal with vague estimates of
probabilities, not mathematical precision. About the only time
perfect equilibrium might arise is when and if statistical likelihoods are exactly balanced. But even in such cases there would
almost always be case-specific facts that would tip the balance
one way or the other. For example, our hijacking hypothetical
poses exact equilibrium-a 50/50 likelihood of guilt as to each
passenger-but adding facts such as the airline attendant's
voice recognition or even something as minor as police observation of which passengers seem nervous, would take the decision-maker off of dead center. In short, the law of probable
cause need not concern itself with the largely theoretical concern of how to deal with "equipoise."
The second level of certainty to be discarded is the "almost
certain" level. Whether this level is equated with beyond a
reasonable doubt or some even higher standard, it really has no
place at the preliminary investigation stage. Certainly the
framers of the Fourth Amendment never contemplated such a
restrictive standard, and the Court has never indicated that it
225
22

•

Id. at 1134-35.
Id. at 1156.
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might raise the bar to require this level of certainty.
With the elimination of the "almost certain" and "equipoise" levels of certainty, the five remaining categories of uncertainty match up with the Supreme Court's approach, although two of these categories are not acknowledged as such by
the Court. At present the Court admits to recognizing three
categories of justification for a search or seizure: (1) traditional
probable cause; (2) reasonable suspicion; and (3) a balancing of
individual and government interests under the general rubric
of reasonableness. Although the Court resists the label, there
are two other levels of justification for search and seizure: (4)
"non-searches" which require no justification;227 and (5) extreme intrusions into personal liberty such as the use of deadly
force 228 or surgical intrusion into the suspect's body, 229
which require the highest level of justification.
SEARCHES FORMERLY KNOWN AS "NON-SEARCHES"

A government practice of placing skymarshals on airplanes
intrudes on personal privacy to the extent that "big brother is
watching" and the passengers have a diminished " right to be
let alone, the right most valued by civilized men." 230 The
Court, however, deals with such diminimus intrusions by placing them beyond the coverage of the Fourth Amendment, and
thus relieves the government of any need to justify its actions.
An expansive view of "non-searches" may have been necessary
when probable cause was seen as the sole and relatively high
standard for all searches and seizures. Under such a monolithic
Fourth Amendment, the Court was faced with many cases in
which it could either impose a probable cause standard that the
government could not meet, or place certain intrusions beyond

227
For example, undercover activity, searches of "open fields" and voluntary
police-citizen encounters fall into this category.
22
• Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985)
229
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
230
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 231 However, with a flexible approach to probable cause and with a suggested standard
of certainty as low as "slight possibility," these intrusions can
be brought within the amendment's scope, where they properly
belong. 232
The question arises as to whether this suggested approach
amounts to anything but word play. What do we gain by bringing most "non-searches" within the amendment's coverage if
that coverage merely requires a level of justification as low as a
slight possibility? In the case of the skymarshals, "search"
versus "non-search" may be a distinction without a difference.
The potential harm of a skyjacking is so great that lowering
the required level of certainty to a "slight possibility" can always be justified. 233 But when the threat is less serious or
less immediate, the level of justification can rise accordingly.
For example, a one percent chance of skyjacking might justify
the use of skymarshals, but when the government wishes to
inspect a citizen's garbage for marijuana residue, a ten percent
possibility of success might be required. Ten percent likelihood
is still quite low, but it exceeds the Court's current approach
which holds that government intrusion into garbage is a nonsearch and thus requires absolutely no justification. 234
Bringing former "non-searches" within the scope of the amendment insures that the police have some rational basis for their
actions, and the sufficiency of that rationale (the odds of sue-

231

"The heart of the Fourth Amendment, the argument runs, is a severe requirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon protected personal security, coupled with a highly developed system of judicial controls to enforce upon the
agents of the State the commands of the Constitution." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
11 (1968).
232
See Amsterdam, supra note 223, at 393 ("A sliding scale approach would
considerably ease the strains that the present monolithic model of the fourth
amendment almost everywhere imposes on the process of defining the
amendment's outer boundaries.").
233
"When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of
dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane,
that danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as" the procedures
involved are reasonable. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 675 n.3 (1989) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2nd
Cir. 1974)).
234
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).

2004)

THE ODDS ON PROBABLE CAUSE

337

cess) can vary according to the nature of the threat and the
degree of intrusion upon privacy or liberty.
EXTREMELY INTRUSIVE GoVERNMENT ACTION

In addition to bringing former "non-searches" within the
amendment's coverage (albeit at the lowest level of required
certainty), I also propose open acknowledgment of the highest
level of certainty required in extraordinary cases, 235 i.e., recognition that the normal level of probable cause is not sufficient to justify abnormal intrusions. The Court has recognized
this principle in connection with police use of deadly force
against a suspect236 and the surgical probing for evidence, 237
situations that "are unusual because of the degree of violence
involved in the search or seizure."238
Like all other levels of required justification, this highest
level should be flexible enough to accommodate extreme threats
and extreme measures of protection against such threats. This
category might be utilized to help resolve a classic, but again
current,239 quandary for a free society--can torture ever be
used to uncover and prevent a threatened mass disaster, for
example, the location of a pirated atomic bomb smuggled into
the United States by terrorists. The fundamental question of
whether torture is ever permissible is not a Fourth Amendment
question. Any absolute limitations on balancing individual
rights against the collective good are better addressed by due
235
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) ("Where probable
cause has existed, the only cases in which we have found it necessary actually to
perform the 'balancing' analysis involved searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner."). Justice Marshall, however, disdained the "extraordinary
manner" language, and espoused a much broader view of the flexible nature of
probable cause-"[i]t is by now established Fourth Amendment doctrine that increasingly severe standards of probable cause are necessary to justify increasingly
intrusive searches." Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 464 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
236
Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
237
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
238
Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1650 (1998).
239
See Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor
Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 275 (2004); Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 201 (2004).
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process considerations. 240 But assuming that torture is ever
acceptable, we certainly would not permit torturing a suspect
based on a slight possibility of some terrorist act. We might,
however, act differently when faced with a ninety percent certainty that detonation of the pirated bomb is imminent.
Recognizing this highest level of required certainty is the
mirror image of recognizing the lowest level of certainty that
should be made applicable to former "non-searches." With these
newly recognized bookends in place, we can sandwich in three
currently existing standards and create a five tiered model of
the levels of certainty required for searches and seizures.
TIERED MODEL OF THE LEVELS OF CERTAINTY REQUIRED FOR
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The parenthetical numbers following each category are
largely arbitrary and necessarily vague, but they help give
some level of concreteness to what might otherwise be an overly theoretical model. At a minimum, such numbers place the
hierarchy of these categories beyond dispute. 241
(1% to 10%)
1) Slight possibility
Reasonable suspicion (20% to 40%)
(40% to 49%)
Fair probability

2)
3)

240

See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 (2003) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, would govern the inquiry in those cases" involving "police torture
or other abuse that results in a confession."); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
172-7 4 (1952) (noting evidence obtained by methods that are "so brutal and so
offensive to human dignity" that they "shock the conscience" violate the Due Process Clause).
241
For example, when watching an Olympic diving event, I might disagree
with the judges whether a particular dive merited an eight rather than a nine,
but at least there is no uncertainty that eight is lower than nine. The Court,
however, sometimes confuses the hierarchical relationship between belief and
suspicion. See supra text accompanying note 53. In general, the Court has shown
a disturbing tendency to coin a new phrase (e.g., non-whimsical suspicion, clear
indication, etc.) to resolve each new or difficult factual situation. "[C]ourts should
clear up their domains where the decision makers cannot tell which standard
prevails or what the prevailing standard means." Clermont, supra note 82, at
1151.
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4) More likely than not
5) High probability
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(51 %)242
(80% to 100%)

CONCLUSION

My examination of mathematical definitions of probable
cause has been less of a tease than the oral arguments in
Pringle, although I do stop short of endorsing precise mathematical expressions of probable cause. Too much precision
diminishes the resources of ambiguity, and as Aristotle cautioned, "(w]e must not look for the same degree of accuracy in
all subjects; we must be content in each class of subjects with
accuracy of such a kind as the subject matter allows."243
In some settings, the required level of certainty can be
expressed with a fair amount of mathematical precision. For
example, the law could specify whether a drug sniffing dog
must have an established track record of reliability in the 30%,
40%, 50% range, and so on. But in the absence of a precisely
measured track record, "in the ordinary task of unaided categorization of amorphous probability . . . we can at best make
little more than an imprecise stab at judgment. "244 In recognition of human cognitive limitations, these stabs at judgment
should be limited and structured into manageable categories of
probabilities. Five such categories may or may not be the magic
number, but they are preferable to the unacceptable complexity
of balancing the totality of the circumstances, 245 or the other

242

Professor LaFave grudgingly conceded that some arrests could be made on
less than a fifty-one percent probability, i.e., the classic hypothetical where police
encounter a dead man and two bystanders who each accuse the other of murdering the victim. He insisted, however, that if the police were permitted to arrest
"upon a less than 50% probability that a crime has even occurred, then this
would open up the possibility that police would generally arrest persons engaged
in activity which was only equivocal," a practice that would result in many intrusions into the freedom and privacy of innocent persons. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.2(e) (3d ed.
1996).
243
FRANK, supra note 119, at 194 (quoting Aristotelian lines).
244
Clermont, supra note 82, at 1146.
••• "The factors in the balancing test have become mere shells, manipulated to
justify unguided conclusions as to what the majority in any given case concludes
is reasonable." Clancy, supra note 116, at 585.
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extreme of a "one size fits all" approach to probable cause. 246
"While the Court has never embraced a case-by-case sliding
scale of probable cause, it has implicitly adopted a category-bycategory sliding scale."247
In summary, my view of the flexible nature of probable
cause rests on a string of theoretical and pragmatic acknowledgments: probable cause must be seen as but one form of
justification for searches and seizures; all justifications reflect
compromises that resolve conflicting government and individual
interests; the same compromise is not mandated in all cases;
thus, the required degree of certainty becomes a flexible standard that is part of the balance or compromise itself.
Given the countervailing needs for both clarity and calibration, for rules and standards, a categorical proportionality approach to probable cause will not arrive at many "bright line"
rules. My five-tiered approach to the levels of certainty required for searches and seizures draws a line that is obviously
subject to attack248 (or further refinement). But by adjusting
the odds to reflect the varying interests at stake, perhaps we
can make the best possible gamble--one in which both sides
Wlll.

248
"Still, whatever the best possible regime is, it seems hard to believe that
the current approach---one category for all crimes-makes sense." Stuntz, supra
note 149, at 870 n.93.
247
Thomas, supra note 202, at 531.
248
"[I]t is too hard to invent categories without giving short shrift to details
that turn out to be important in a given instance, and without inflating marginal
ones." United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003).

